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substances – but rather those objects that are included in the very essence (*kat'ousian*) of soul, objects of which the demiurgic Intellect, as the account of the making of soul in the *Timaeus* tells us, inserted the arithmetical, geometrical and harmonic principles in the soul.²² 10

We will therefore say that it is possible even to speak of all intelligible substance as being one, when we separate only perceptible substance from it ('what is always, having no coming-to-be, and what becomes, never being?'),²³ according to the division in two of whatever in some way is. But it is also possible to subdivide invisible substance known by reason (*logismôî*) into what is properly intelligible substance and what is discursive substance, according to the [division of] the line in the *Republic*.²⁴ And since it is also possible to subdivide each of these (for we accept many ranks of intelligibles and intellectuals), the realm of souls too will show itself to include in many ways much differentiation with regard to substance, to whom-ever cares to distinguish the kinds of beings. 15 20

Fifth Problem

995b18-20 And this, therefore, as we say, we should examine, and also whether the study simply concerns substances, or also the essential accidents of substances.

Does wisdom, he says, just examine the substances of things, or essential accidents? We will say: both substances and what belongs in this way to them. For by the analytical [method] wisdom grasps the principles of being, by the divisional and definitional [method] the substances of all things, by the demonstrative inferring the essential properties of substances. This, however, is not the case with substances which are the most simple and properly speaking intelligible, for these substances are entirely that which they precisely are (*hoper eisi*). For this reason they cannot be defined or demonstrated, but are grasped only by apprehension (*epibolê*), as Aristotle often states, saying 'intellect either touched or not',²⁵ as does the divine Plato: 'only grasped by the governing intellect of soul'.²⁶ But it is the case for intermediate substances, which can be demonstrated as regards the properties in them. 25 30

This is the situation: for the simplest of beings, there is nothing belonging to them besides their being (*to einai*), so that for them there is not both substance and something else; therefore they are beyond both definition and demonstration. However, essential accidents do belong to universal rational principles (*katholou logoi*), both taken in themselves and as they order (5) perceptible nature; thus demonstration concerns these accidents. And [these] accidents, properly speaking, also appear in forms that are enmattered, individual and by now perceptible: they come to be and disappear without 35 5,1

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[involving] the destruction of their substrate. Such accidents, in turn,
5 falling short of what can be demonstrated, come to be grasped
through a process of imaging (*eikotologia*), not indeed by the wise
man as wise,²⁷ but, for example, by doctors, students of physics and
all suchlike.

Sixth Problem

995b20-5 In addition, concerning the same, the different, the
similar and dissimilar, contrariety, the prior and posterior and
all the rest which dialecticians seek to examine basing the
examination on received opinions only, who is to study all of
this?

Now that it belongs to the wise man, according to Aristotle himself,
10 to examine both substances and essential accidents, this is what the
preface (*prooimion*) to book 4 proclaims, where it says "There is a
science which studies being as being and what belongs essentially to
it' (1003a21-2). But as regards the matters now at hand for study,
they would seem especially to belong essentially to being, as might
be shown by their being found throughout all beings. For sameness
and difference, similarity and dissimilarity, and such things as he
15 now presents are not to be found as present only in some beings, and
as absent from others. But starting from the intelligible [realities]
above, ordering all that which is intelligible and divine, [going]
through psychic substance, these come down to the nature of the
universe (*phusis tôn holôn*), to the heavens and to what is in becom-
ing: from the nature of the One which is absolutely good (*panagathos*)
20 they impart to beings identity, equality and similarity; but they also
confer both on invisible and on perceptible substances differences,
dissimilarities, inequalities, contraries, the prior and posterior, and
all such things, deriving them from the most productive and inex-
haustible cause of all things, the infinitely powerful Dyad. Thus there
is nothing that is not ordered by these forms, neither a nature
intermediate between indivisible and divisible [beings], nor a [sub-
25 stance] transcending in this way in its excellence the whole (*tôn*
holôn), nor one which has declined to the ultimate of perceptible
effects (*dêmiourgêmata*). And it is for this reason that Plato, investi-
gating in the *Sophist* the kinds of being which traverse all beings,
enumerated identity, difference, being, stability, movement, and
30 showed as well the nature of what is not, which holds the one cause
both of all difference and of opposition and contrariety.²⁸ And further-
more, in enumerating the first of the Forms in the *Parmenides*, he
mentioned similarity and the others, both prior to the hypotheses, in
the arguments (*skemmasi*) about the Forms,²⁹ and in the hypotheses
themselves: by means of the first hypothesis showing that these are

identity

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things which are determined not to be curved by means of a straight-edge¹⁶⁹ should contest pride of place with those which do measure up to it. But if those objects which geometry <considers>¹⁷⁰ are superior in immateriality, purity, precision and truth, are not the following two points shown?: that geometry concerns worthy and valuable kinds of things (*genê*); and that superior and more divine paradigms of what is in¹⁷¹ the heavens pre-exist in the demiurgic intellect and in soul as a whole, which our constituted nature (*sustasis*), having
30 images of them, knows, encompassing both what is in the universe
35 by means of more universal reason-principles, and what is in [the soul's] most primary causes, ascending thus through the images in it to the archetypal substance.

28.14 But it is also absurd to refute (28) geometry by taking it that points are not equal to stars. For neither do astronomers say that stars are points, nor does geometry seek to take as points such things which belong entirely to the perceptible. But if one were in general to refute in this way the geometers, on the grounds that that of which they
5 speak is not visible in perceptible things, one should examine the poles or the centre of the universe.

But let these things go, and let us examine Aristotle's correction of the last opinion of those who introduce several [kinds of] substances.

998a7-19 But there are some who say that there are these intermediates which are said to be between Forms and perceptibles, but that they are not separate from perceptibles but in them. All the impossible implications of this would require a longer discussion, but the following considerations will suffice. For it is not plausible that this applies only to the intermediates, but it is clear that Forms could also be in perceptibles (for the same account concerns both cases). Then again it would be necessary that two solids be in the same place, and would not be unmoved, being in perceptibles which move. And in general for what reason would one posit these things as existing, yet as being in perceptibles? For there will be the same absurd implications as those said before, for there will be a heaven besides the heaven, yet not separate, but in the same place, which is most impossible.

As to those who say there is some intermediate thing between intelligible Forms and perceptibles, and that this intermediate nature is in the lowest, enmattered forms, if they say that the whole of
10 the intermediate is in perceptible particulars, they admittedly err. But if they say, given that one can in several ways conceive of universal man, say, and the sun (one being in the soul of the universe, another in the cosmic nature, another in our souls), that there is a

Nothing is not one per accidens, but in the way that it is precisely a being, so is it precisely a one. So that unity is, in as many ways, as being is.

The Essential Properties of Being

2. Unity, Multiplicity and their Species

Since both [unity and being]³⁵² are the same, in examining substances and all beings, the philosopher will examine the differentiae of unity. The differentiae of unity, what are as it were its species (*eidê*), are: the same, the similar, the equal, the straight and, as a whole, the better of the columns,³⁵³ just as the more deficient column follows multiplicity. Our philosopher himself dealt indeed specifically with this, making a selection of all the contraries³⁵⁴ and arranging some under unity, others under multiplicity. 15

If therefore philosophy as a whole will be about substances and about the differentiae of unity and multiplicity, its parts will be about the kinds of substances.³⁵⁵ Of substances one [kind] is intelligible and eternal, the other sensible and destructible. Therefore first philosophy will be that concerned with intelligible and unmoved substance, that part of philosophy which comes after this and which is second dealing with nature. For as being and unity have species (*eidê*), one primary, the others subsequent to it, thus also will the sciences be ranked corresponding to beings. For philosophy includes in itself the prior and posterior, like mathematics. Thus, as the arithmetician is prior to the geometer, and he to the astronomer, and he to the engineer (*mêkhanikos*), for example, so also are the species of philosophy as a whole arranged in the series: first, intermediate, last. 20

Since it belongs to one science to know what are in every way opposites to each other, in knowing unity it must know multiplicity. For multiplicity is the negation or privation of unity.³⁵⁶ These oppositions differ from each other in that negation is true of all that which is besides unity, when unity is removed (for 'not horse' is true of all that which is besides horse).³⁵⁷ But it is not so in the case of privation. For it is not simply because some state is absent that privation comes <to mind>³⁵⁸ (for being blind is not the fact of not having sight, or else a stone would be blind), but it is because this state is absent from that which is of a nature to receive it. Thus it is not everything which does not hear that is deaf, but an ear, if it does not hear, since it is in its nature to hear. For one nature must underlie the state and the privation. And this difference between privation and negation is very great. However, whether multiplicity is a privation or a negation of unity (since it is possible to consider unity in terms of each of these), it belongs to the same philosopher to know unity and multiplicity. For in general it belongs to the one science to know things which are opposite to each other with respect to any kind of opposition. 25

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