

## V. 1. (10) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΤΡΙΩΝ ΑΡΧΙΚΩΝ ΥΠΟΣΤΑΣΕΩΝ

1. Τί ποτε ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ πεποιηκὸς τὰς ψυχὰς πατρὸς θεοῦ ἐπιλαθέσθαι, καὶ μοίρας ἐκείθεν οὐσας καὶ ὅλως ἐκείνου ἀγνοῆσαι καὶ ἑαυτὰς καὶ ἐκείνον; ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν αὐταῖς τοῦ κακοῦ ἢ τόλμα 5 καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ πρώτη ἑτερότης καὶ τὸ βουληθῆναι δὲ ἑαυτῶν εἶναι. τῷ δὲ αὐτεξουσίῳ ἐπειδὴ περ ἐφάνησαν ἡσθεῖσαι, πολλῶ τῷ κινεῖσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν κεχρημέναι, τὴν ἐναντίαν δραμοῦσαι καὶ πλείστην ἀπόστασιν πεποιημέναι, ἠγνόησαν καὶ ἑαυτὰς ἐκείθεν εἶναι. ὥσπερ παῖδες εὐθύς 10 ἀποσπασθέντες ἀπὸ πατέρων καὶ πολὺν χρόνον πόρρω τραφέντες ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ ἑαυτοὺς καὶ πατέρας. οὐτ' οὖν ἔτι ἐκείνον οὔτε ἑαυτὰς ὀρῶσαι, ἀτιμάσασαι ἑαυτὰς ἀγνοία τοῦ γένους, τιμήσασαι τὰλλα καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτὰς

<sup>1</sup> τόλμα was a Neopythagorean name for the Indefinite Dyad (for which see below ch. 5) "because it separated itself from the One": cp. Plutarch *De Iside et Osiride* 75, 381 F; Iamblichus *Theologoumena Arithmeticae* 7, 19 and 9, 6 de Falco (quoting Anatolius, the third-century Aristotelian professor at Alexandria who became a Christian bishop). Plotinus several times in the *Enneads* takes up this Pythagorean idea and sees the root of all multiplicity, that is of all reality other than and inferior to the One or good, in an audacious act of self-assertion, a will to independent existence. This is applied

## V. 1. ON THE THREE PRIMARY HYPOSTASES

1. What is it, then, which has made the souls forget their father, God, and be ignorant of themselves and him, even though they are parts which come from his higher world and altogether belong to it? The beginning of evil for them was audacity<sup>1</sup> and coming to birth and the first otherness and the wishing to belong to themselves. Since they were clearly delighted with their own independence, and made great use of self-movement, running the opposite course and getting as far away as possible, they were ignorant even that they themselves came from that world; just as children who are immediately torn from their parents and brought up far away do not know who they themselves or their parents are. Since they do not any more see their father or themselves, they despise themselves through ignorance of their birth and honour other things, admiring everything rather than themselves, and, to Intellect's coming into separate existence at VI. 9. 5. 29 (where the word *τολμήσας* is used); cp. III. 8. 8. 32-6. And the passage here about the *τόλμα* of soul is closely parallel in thought to that on the origin of time in III. 7. 11 (the word *τόλμα* is not used there, but cp. *ἀρχεῖν αὐτῆς βουλομένης καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς* lines 15-16, with *τὸ βουλευθῆναι ἑαυτῶν εἶναι* here. See further Naguib Baladi *La Pensée de Plotin* (Paris 1970), which is entirely concerned with the theme of audacity in Plotinus, and my discussion in the *Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Mediaeval Philosophy* 242-5.

- θαυμάσασαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐκπλαγεῖσαι καὶ  
 15 ἀγασθεῖσαι καὶ ἐξηρητημένοι τούτων, ἀπέρρηξαν  
 ὡς οἶόν τε ἑαυτὰς ὧν ἀπεστράφησαν ἀτιμάσασαι·  
 ὥστε συμβαίνει τῆς παντελοῦς ἀγνοίας ἐκείνου ἢ  
 τῶνδε τιμῆ καὶ ἢ ἑαυτῶν ἀτιμία εἶναι αἰτία.  
 ἅμα γὰρ διώκεται ἄλλο καὶ θαυμάζεται, καὶ τὸ  
 θαυμάζον καὶ διώκον ὁμολογεῖ χεῖρον εἶναι·  
 20 χεῖρον δὲ αὐτὸ τιθέμενον γιγνομένων καὶ ἀπολ-  
 λυμένων ἀτιμωτάτον τε καὶ θνητότατον πάντων ὧν  
 τιμῆ ὑπολαμβάνον οὔτε θεοῦ φύσιν οὔτε δύναμιν  
 ἂν ποτε ἐν θυμῷ βάλοιτο. διὸ δεῖ διττὸν γίγνεσθαι  
 τὸν λόγον πρὸς τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, εἴπερ τις  
 ἐπιστρέψει αὐτοὺς εἰς τὰ ἐναντία καὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ  
 25 ἀνάγοι μέχρι τοῦ ἀκροτάτου καὶ ἐνὸς καὶ πρώτου.  
 τίς οὖν ἐκάτερος; ὁ μὲν δεικνύς τὴν ἀτιμίαν τῶν  
 τῶν ψυχῇ τιμωμένων, ὃν ἐν ἄλλοις δόμεν ἐπιπλέον,  
 ὁ δὲ διδάσκων καὶ ἀναμνησκων τὴν ψυχὴν οἶον  
 τοῦ γένους καὶ τῆς ἀξίας, ὃς πρότερός ἐστιν  
 ἐκείνου καὶ σαφηνισθεὶς κάκεῖνον δηλώσει. περὶ  
 30 οὗ νῦν λεκτέον· ἐγγὺς γὰρ οὗτος τοῦ ζητουμένου  
 καὶ πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς ἐκεῖνον. τὸ γὰρ ζητοῦν ἐστι  
 ψυχῆ, καὶ τί ὃν ζητεῖ γνωστότεον αὐτῇ, ἵνα αὐτὴν

<sup>1</sup> Plotinus seems to have in mind the sort of melancholy commonplace, contrasting the transitoriness of human life with the ceaseless self-renewal of non-human nature, which found its finest expressions in the Latin poetry of the first century B.C., e.g. Catullus 5, Horace *Odes* IV. 7; cp. [Moschus] *Elegy on Bion* 99-104 (which may have inspired Catullus).

<sup>2</sup> Editors disagree on where, if anywhere, in the *Enneads*

astonished and delighted by and dependent on these [earthly] things, they broke themselves loose as far as they could in contempt of that from which they turned away; so that their honour for these things here and their contempt for themselves is the cause of their utter ignorance of God. For what pursues and admires something else admits at the same time its own inferiority; but by making itself inferior to things which come into being and perish and considering itself the most contemptible and the most liable to death of all the things which it admires<sup>1</sup> it could not possibly have any idea of the nature and power of God. One must therefore speak in two ways to men who are in this state of mind, if one is going to turn them round to what lies in the opposite direction and is primary, and to lead them up to that which is highest, one, and first. What, then, are these two ways? One shows how contemptible are the things now honoured by the soul, and this we shall develop more amply elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> but the other teaches and reminds the soul how high its birth and value are, and this is prior to the other one and when it is clarified will also make the other obvious. This is what we must speak about now; it is close to the subject of our investigation and will be useful for that other discourse. For that which investigates is the soul, and it should know what it

this fuller treatment is to be found, and it seems better to suppose with Harder that Plotinus may never have carried out his plan for a full-scale discourse on contempt of this world, at any rate in writing—perhaps because he found it very hard really to despise our world of sense, though he sometimes felt he ought to do so, and when challenged by people who really despised and hated it (the Gnostics) he defended its beauty and goodness passionately (cp. II. 9).

πρότερον μάθη, εἰ δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 ζητεῖν, καὶ εἰ ὄμμα τοιοῦτον ἔχει, οἷον ἰδεῖν, καὶ εἰ  
 προσήκει ζητεῖν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀλλότρια, τί δεῖ; εἰ  
 35 δὲ συγγενῆ, καὶ προσήκει καὶ δύναται εὐρεῖν.

2. Ἐνθυμείσθω τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐκεῖνο πᾶσα  
 ψυχὴ, ὡς αὐτὴ μὲν ζῶα ἐποίησε πάντα ἐμπνεύσασα  
 αὐτοῖς ζῶην, ἃ τε γῆ τρέφει ἃ τε θάλασσα ἃ τε ἐν  
 αἴρι ἃ τε ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστρα θεῖα, αὐτὴ δὲ ἥλιον,  
 5 αὐτὴ δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανόν, καὶ αὐτὴ  
 ἐκόσμησεν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν τάξει περιάγει φύσις οὔσα  
 ἑτέρα ὧν κοσμεῖ καὶ ὧν κινεῖ καὶ ἃ ζῆν ποιεῖ· καὶ  
 τούτων ἀνάγκη εἶναι τιμωτέραν, γιγνομένων  
 τούτων καὶ φθειρομένων, ὅταν αὐτὰ ψυχὴ ἀπολείπη  
 ἢ χορηγῆ τὸ ζῆν, αὐτὴ δὲ οὔσα αἰεὶ τῷ μὴ ἀπο-  
 10 λείπειν ἑαυτήν. τίς δὴ τρόπος τῆς χορηγίας τοῦ  
 ζῆν ἐν τε τῷ σύμπαντι ἐν τε τοῖς ἐκάστοις, ὧδε  
 λογιζέσθω. σκοπεῖσθω δὲ τὴν μεγάλην ψυχὴν  
 ἄλλη ψυχὴ οὐ σμικρὰ ἀξία τοῦ σκοπεῖν γενομένη  
 ἀπαλλαγεῖσα ἀπάτης καὶ τῶν γεγοητευκότων τὰς  
 ἄλλας ἡσυχῶ τῇ καταστάσει. ἡσυχον δὲ αὐτῇ  
 15 ἔστω μὴ μόνον τὸ περικείμενον σῶμα καὶ ὁ τοῦ  
 σώματος κλύδων, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶν τὸ περιέχον·  
 ἡσυχος μὲν γῆ, ἡσυχος δὲ θάλασσα καὶ ἄηρ καὶ

<sup>1</sup> This phrase is taken from Plato *Phaedrus* 245C9. The whole account of soul's cosmic activity here is inspired by *Phaedrus* 245C5ff. and *Laws* X 895A5ff.

<sup>2</sup> This passage made a deep impression on both St. Basil (*Hom. XV de fide* II 131c-d Garnier=PG 31, 465A-B; *De Spiritu* I 320C-322A Garnier=PG 29, 768B-772B—Basil is here making extensive use of the whole passage 1. 29-3. 10) and St. Augustine, whose adaptation of it in his account of

is as an investigating soul, so that it may learn first about itself, whether it has the power to investigate things of this kind, and if it has an eye of the right kind to see them, and if the investigation is suitable for it. For if the objects are alien, what is the point? But if they are akin, the investigation is suitable and discovery is possible.

2. Let every soul, then, first consider this, that it made all living things itself, breathing life into them, those that the earth feeds and those that are nourished by the sea, and the divine stars in the sky; it made the sun itself, and this great heaven, and adorned it itself, and drives it round itself, in orderly movement; it is a nature other than the things which it adorns and moves and makes live; and it must necessarily be more honourable than they, for they come into being or pass away when the soul leaves them or grants life to them, but soul itself exists for ever because "it does not depart from itself".<sup>1</sup> This is how soul should reason about the manner in which it grants life in the whole universe and in individual things. Let it look at the great soul, being itself another soul which is no small one, which has become worthy to look by being freed from deceit and the things that have bewitched the other souls, and is established in quietude. Let not only its encompassing body and the body's raging sea be quiet, but all its environment: the earth quiet, and the sea and air quiet, and the heaven itself at peace.<sup>2</sup> Into

the spiritual experience which he shared with his mother at Ostia is deservedly famous (*Confessions* IX 10, 25ff.). The σώματος κλύδων may be inspired by Plato *Timaeus* 43B5; for the metaphor cp. the oracle of Apollo on Plotinus (*Porphry Life* 22, 25-6 and 30-4).

30 αὐτῆς αἰεί· ἢ ἅμα δυνατὸν καὶ ἄμφω, λαμβανούσῃ  
 μὲν ἐκείθεν, χορηγούσῃ δὲ ἅμα ἐνταῦθα, ἐπεὶ περ  
 ἀμήχανον ἦν μὴ καὶ τούτων ἐφάπτεσθαι ψυχῆ  
 οὔσῃ.

8. Καὶ εἰ χρή παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τολμήσαι  
 τὸ φαινόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον, οὐ πᾶσα οὐδ' ἡ  
 ἡμετέρα ψυχῆ ἔδν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ  
 αἰεί· τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ εἰ κρατοῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰ  
 5 κρατοῖτο καὶ θορυβοῖτο, οὐκ ἔα αἰσθησιν ἡμῖν εἶναι  
 ὧν θεᾶται τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω. τότε γὰρ ἔρχεται εἰς  
 ἡμᾶς τὸ νοηθέν, ὅταν εἰς αἰσθησιν ἦκη καταβαῖνον·  
 οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ γίνεταί περὶ ὅτιοῦν μέρος ψυχῆς,  
 γινώσκωμεν, πρὶν ἂν εἰς ὅλην τὴν ψυχὴν ἦκη· οἷον  
 10 καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ μένουσα γινώσ-  
 κεται ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὅταν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ τῇ ἔνδον δυνάμει  
 ἢ καὶ διανοητικῇ ἀντιλαβώμεθα ἢ ἄμφω. πᾶσα  
 γὰρ ψυχῆ ἔχει τι καὶ τοῦ κάτω πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τοῦ  
 ἄνω πρὸς νοῦν. καὶ ἡ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλου τῷ αὐτῆς  
 15 μέρει τῷ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὅλον κοσμεῖ ὑπερέχου-  
 σα ἀπόνως, ὅτι μὴδ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ, ὡς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ  
 νῶ ὡς ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλευέται,<sup>1</sup> †τὸ κάτω

<sup>1</sup> R<sup>2</sup>ms (consultare Ficinus): βούλεται Enn.

<sup>1</sup> For this doctrine, that our consciousness of what goes on in the soul is limited and dependent on our bodily condition, cp. IV. 3. (27) 30 and I. 4. (46) 10.

<sup>2</sup> "Art does not deliberate" is a quotation from Aristotle's *Physics* B 199b28-9: "Art in fact does not deliberate either, and if the ship building art were incorporate in the timber, it would proceed by nature in the same way in which it now proceeds by art" (tr. Wicksteed-Cornford). This passage seems to be the starting-point for the development of the doctrine that the activity of Soul and Nature in forming

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and remains attached to the realities before it for ever; both are certainly possible; it can receive from There and at the same time distribute here, since it was impracticable for it as soul not to be in contact with this world.

8. And, if one ought to dare to express one's own view more clearly, contradicting the opinion of others, even our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in the intelligible; but if the part which is in the world of sense-perception gets control, or rather if it is itself brought under control, and thrown into confusion [by the body], it prevents us from perceiving the things which the upper part of the soul contemplates.<sup>1</sup> For what is grasped by the intellect reaches us when it arrives at perception in its descent, for we do not know everything which happens in any part of the soul before it reaches the whole soul; for instance desire which remains in the desiring part is known by us, but [only] when we apprehend it by the power of inner sense or discursive reason, or both. For every soul has something of what is below, in the direction of the body, and of what is above, in the direction of Intellect. And the soul which is a whole and is the soul of the whole, by its part which is directed to body, maintains the beauty and order of the whole in effortless transcendence because it does not do so by calculating and considering, as we do, but by intellect, as art does not deliberate. . . .<sup>2</sup> But the

directing the physical world is non-deliberative, on which Plotinus always insists strongly. It seems impossible to make any tolerable sense of the words which follow, and no convincing emendations have been suggested; so I follow Harder in leaving them untranslated.



PLOTINUS: ENNEAD IV. 8.

αὐτῆς κοσμοῦντος ὃ τι ὅλου †. αἱ δ' ἐν μέρει  
 γινόμεναι καὶ μέρους ἔχουσι μὲν καὶ αὐταὶ τὸ  
 ὑπερέχον, ἄσχολοι δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ ἀντιλήψει  
 20 πολλῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καὶ  
 λυπούντων καὶ ταραπτόντων, ἅτε οὐ ἐπιμέλονται  
 μέρους καὶ ἔλλειπούς καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντος τὰ ἀλ-  
 λότρια κύκλω, πολλὰ δὲ ὧν ἐφίεται· καὶ ἡδεται δὲ  
 καὶ ἡδονὴ ἠπάτησε. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνήδονον ὄν  
 τὰς προσκαίρους ἡδονάς, ἡ δὲ διαγωγὴ ὁμοία.

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souls which are partial and of a part have also the transcendent element, but they are occupied with sense-perception, and by their [lower] faculty of conscious apprehension they apprehend many things which are contrary to their nature and grieve and trouble them, since what they care for is a part, and defective, and has a great many alien and hostile things around it, and a great many which it desires; and it has pleasures, and pleasure deceives it; but there is a higher part which the transitory pleasures do not please, and its life is conformable [to its nature].

ὅσα τὰς αἰτίας ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἅπαντα, λόγον ὦν καὶ αἰτίας καὶ οὐσίας αἰτιώδους πατήρ, ἃ δὴ πάντα πόρρω ὑπάρχει τύχης, εἴη ἂν ἀρχὴ καὶ οἶον παράδειγμα τῶν ὅσα μὴ κεκοινώνηκε τύχη, τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀμιγῆς τύχαις καὶ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ συμβάσει, αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτός· καὶ γὰρ πρῶτως αὐτὸς καὶ ὑπερόντως αὐτός.

15. Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως, ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἔχοι, εἰ μὴ τὸ συνὸν καὶ τὸ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν εἴη. εἰ δὲ τὸ συνὸν τῷ ᾧ σύνεστιν ἐν καὶ τὸ οἶον ἐφιέμενον τῷ ἐφετῷ ἔν, τὸ δὲ ἐφετὸν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οἶον ὑποκείμενον, πάλιν αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ταῦτόν ἢ ἔφεςις καὶ ἡ οὐσία. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐστὶν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ οὐχ ὡς τι ἕτερον ἠθέλησε γινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτός. καὶ μὴν καὶ λέγοντες αὐτὸν οὔτε τι εἰς αὐτὸν δέχεσθαι οὔτε ἄλλο αὐτὸν καὶ ταύτη ἂν εἴημεν ἔξω ποιῶντες τοῦ τύχῃ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐ μόνον τῷ μονοῦν αὐτὸν καὶ τῷ καθαρὸν ποιεῖν ἀπάντων, ἀλλ' ὅτι, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνίδοιμέν τινα φύσιν

<sup>1</sup>There is a reference here to the *Platonic Letter* VI 323D4, one of the esoteric passages (with *Letter* II 312E) from dubiously genuine letters which were foundation-texts for

this" with the things which have their cause in themselves, and all things which come from him do have it, for he is the father of reason and cause and causative substance,<sup>1</sup> which are certainly all far from chance, he would be the principle and in a way the exemplar of all things which have no part in chance, truly and primarily, uncontaminated by chances and coincidence and happening, cause of himself and himself from himself and through himself; for he is primarily self and self beyond being.

15. And he, that same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in himself. For surely his keeping company with himself could not be in any other way than if what keeps company and what it keeps company with were the one and the same. But if what keeps company is one with what it keeps company with and what is, in a way, desiring is one with the object of desire, and the object of desire is on the side of existence and a kind of substrate, again it has become apparent to us that the desire and the substance are the same. But if this is so, again it is he himself who makes himself and is master of himself and has not come to be as something else willed, but as he himself wills. And further, when we say that he does not receive anything into himself nor does anything else receive him, in this way too we shall be placing something of this kind outside chance existence not only by making him one alone and clear of all things but for this reason: if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this

the Neoplatonists, giving Platonic authority for the doctrine of the Three Hypostases.

15 τοιαύτην οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συνήρτηται  
 ἡμῖν, καθὰ πάσχειν ὃ τί περ ἂν συμβῆ [καί]<sup>1</sup> κατὰ  
 τύχην ὑπάρχει—πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἡμῶν, δοῦλα  
 κάκκειμενα<sup>2</sup> τύχαις καὶ οἶον κατὰ τύχην προσελθόντα,  
 τούτῳ δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κύριον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον  
 20 φωτὸς ἀγαθοειδοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ μείζονος ἢ  
 κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ὑπὲρ τὸ νοεῖν ἐχούσης· εἰς ὃ  
 δὴ ἀναβάντες καὶ γενόμενοι τοῦτο μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα  
 ἀφέντες, τί ἂν εἴπομεν αὐτὸ ἢ ὅτι πλέον ἢ ἐλεύθεροι,  
 καὶ πλέον ἢ αὐτεξούσιοι; τίς δ' ἂν ἡμᾶς προσάψειε τότε  
 25 τύχαις ἢ τῷ εἰκῆ ἢ τῷ “συμβέβηκεν” αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθινὸν  
 ζῆν γενομένους ἢ ἐν τούτῳ γενομένους, ὃ μηδὲν ἔχει  
 ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτὸ μόνον; τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα μονούμενα  
 οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς αὐτάρκη εἶναι εἰς τὸ εἶναι· τοῦτο δέ  
 ἔστιν ὃ ἔστι καὶ μονούμενον. ὑπόστασις δὲ πρώτη οὐκ ἐν  
 ἀψύχῳ οὐδ' ἐν ζωῇ ἀλόγῳ· ἀσθενῆς γὰρ εἰς τὸ εἶναι καὶ  
 30 αὕτη σκέδασις οὔσα λόγου καὶ ἀοριστία· ἀλλ' ὅσω  
 πρόεισιν εἰς λόγον, ἀπολείπει τύχην· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ λόγον  
 οὐ τύχη· ἀναβαίνουσι δὲ ἡμῖν ἐκείνο μὲν οὐ λόγος,  
 κάλλιον δὲ ἢ λόγος· τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ τύχη  
 συμβῆναι. ρίζα γὰρ λόγου παρ' αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς τοῦτο  
 35 λήγει τὰ πάντα, ὡσπερ φυτοῦ μεγίστου κατὰ λόγον  
 ζῶντος ἀρχὴ καὶ βᾶσις, μένουσα γὰρ αὐτῆ ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς,  
 διδοῦσα δὲ κατὰ λόγον τῷ φυτῷ, ὃν ἔλαβεν, εἶναι.

<sup>1</sup> del. H-S<sup>1</sup>.<sup>2</sup> coniectimus: καὶ κείμενα Enn.

kind which has nothing of the other things which are attached to us by which we have to experience whatever happens by chance—for all the other things which belong to us are enslaved to and exposed to chances, and come to us in a way by chance, but this alone has self-mastery and self-disposal by the active presence of a light in the form of good, and good, and greater than that which belongs to Intellect, having its transcendence of Intellect not as something brought in from outside, surely, when we ascend to this and become this alone and let the rest go, what can we say of it except that we are more than free and more than independent? Who could then make us depend on chances or randomness or just happening when we have become the true life itself or come to be in it, which has nothing else but is itself alone? For the other things when they are isolated cannot be self-sufficient enough to exist, but this is what it is also when it is isolated. But as first existence it is not in the soulless and not in irrational life, for this also is too weak to exist and is a dispersal of rational principle and an indefiniteness, but in so far as it advances towards rational principle, it leaves chance behind, for that which is in accordance with rational principle is not by chance. But for us as we ascend that is not rational principle but more beautiful than rational principle, so far is it from happening by chance. For it is the root of rational principle from itself, and all things come to a stop in it, it is like the principle and fundament of a mighty tree living according to rational principle which remains itself by itself but gives to the tree existence according to the rational principle which it receives.