

10 says that it belongs to the philosopher to deal with the things opposed to these. But otherness is opposed to sameness, unlikeness to likeness, and inequality to equality. That one is higher than sameness, likeness, and equality, he makes clear in the words 'practically all the contraries are reduced to this principle' [1003b36-1004a1]. By 'principle' he means the pair of contraries: one and that which is opposed
15 to one, i.e. multiplicity (*ta polla*). For sameness is a kind of one, while the other is a plurality (*plêthos*) and consists in plurality. Likewise likeness and equality fall under one, unlikeness and inequality under plurality.

Concerning the knowledge that practically all the contraries are reduced to one and plurality as a principle, Aristotle refers us to the *Selection of Contraries*, where he specifically treated of these; he has also spoken concerning such a selection in the second book of *On the*
20 *Good*.¹⁰⁷

1004a2-3 And there are just as many parts of philosophy as there are [types of] substances.

Since one kind of being is¹⁰⁸ being in the proper sense and essentially, while another kind is being accidentally; and since substance is being in the proper sense and essentially, while the properties of substance and, in general, things that have reference to substance, are beings
25 accidentally; and since, as we have said [1003b16-17; 244,10-28], in the case of all things which have this order, the science concerned with them is in the proper sense the science of the primary thing on which the others depend and on account of which the others are also called beings; and since philosophy is concerned with being, philosophy in the proper sense would be¹⁰⁹ a science concerned with substance; for substance is being in the proper sense. And since there are several kinds of substances, the science concerned with substance, which is philosophy, will, while being one in genus, have as many
30 parts and species as there are kinds of substances. And, as some substances are primary while others are secondary, so too there will be a primary philosophy, and after it a secondary philosophy, following the order in substances themselves.

This statement would follow from the statement made a little earlier: 'so if substance is this, it would be necessary for the philosopher to grasp the principles and causes of substances' [1003b17-19].
251,1 For the statement 'and [there are]¹¹⁰ just as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substances' [1004a2-3] follows from this. This is why his meaning would be clearer if this statement¹¹¹ were placed [directly] before the words 'if, then, being and one are the same'
5 [1003b22-3], linking up with 'which is why it belongs to a science which is one in genus also to consider the species of being,¹¹² as well

outside [nature], also tried to speak about these things, on the supposition that the axioms belonged to being insofar as it is being. For some of the natural philosophers tried to speak about them, because they thought that they themselves were speaking about all being; for they thought that there was nothing outside natural things. So, then, insofar as they supposed that discussion of these things was proper to the discussion of all being in general, they were acting as they ought to have acted, but they erred in supposing that there was nothing outside the natural things of which they were treating. For being is more extensive than natural things, and there are even certain beings distinct from natural things; for incorporeal and unmoved substance is not a natural substance.²³⁷ 'For nature is some one genus of being' [1005a34], a principle and cause of motion, in virtue of itself, for the things in which it is. This is why the consideration of the properties of being insofar as it is being does not belong to the natural philosopher²³⁸ but rather to the [primary] philosopher, who is higher than the natural philosopher, and who carries on a consideration of all being insofar as it is being, and most of all and primarily concerning that which is most of all [a being], i.e. is primary among beings, which is indeed substance, but not natural substance. For, while natural philosophy²³⁹ is a kind of wisdom and philosophy, it is not the primary kind. The primary wisdom or philosophy would be that which considers the primary substances, which considers in a universal way (*katholou*) all substance and the things which are themselves beings by virtue of belonging to substance. The same science turns out to be primary in both ways: [i] as the science which considers primary substances it also considers all other things whose being depends on these; and [ii] as the science which considers in a general way (*koinôs*) being insofar as it is being it would (since being is among the things spoken of as derived from one thing and with reference to one thing) consider most of all this [highest] nature, to which the other things which it discusses are referred, and that from which they derive their being.

That this, which he now calls general and primary philosophy, is that which he called 'wisdom' in the first book [*Metaph.* 1.1-2], is clear from his statement 'natural philosophy too is a kind of philosophy, but not primary' [1005b1-2]. For it was to primary wisdom that consideration of these things belonged, but now he calls it 'philosophy', and he says that primary philosophy and primary wisdom, wisdom in the most proper sense, are the same.

He says that the primary philosopher will speak about the axioms, not as though he were going to demonstrate any of them (for the principles of demonstration are, as he says, indemonstrable²⁴⁰) but rather [to tell] what their nature is, and how they come to be present in us, and how we ought to use them, and such other points about