

BETWEEN ETERNITY AND DIVINE DUALISM: HUGH OF SAINT-CHER'S OPUS II, PARS I

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ABSTRACT. The paper contains the first Latin transcription and an English translation of the first part of the second book of Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Opus*, his commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* accomplished between 1231 and 1234. The transcription is based on the codex Vat. lat. 1098 collated with five auxiliary manuscripts. In line with William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales Hugh critically disavows pagan and heretical stances represented by Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Manichean regarding the creation of the world. My foreword sheds light on the philosophical value of presented arguments plus the historical background of the issue and Hugh's relation with contemporary theologians whose ideas Hugh rearranges and modifies in one concise text. I argue that Hugh blends together these four authorities to challenge and reject the concepts of eternity and dualism. The theologian imputes dualism — contrary to the run-of-the-mill attribution of three beginnings — to the Stagyrite while putting the concept of opposite principles from Aristotle referenced before by William in Cathar's mouth. Even Plato and Epicurus become proponents of the heretical repudiation of creation from nothing in favor of divine production from adjacent matter which aligns the Greeks with Cathars' metaphysics. Hugh's *Opus*, if not original in the modern sense, anticipated a surge of refutations aimed at heretics and “Averroists”. The proposed isomorphism between Aristotle-Heretic and Cathar-Peripatetic partially molded early arguments in the theological *Sentences* as well as inquisitorial *Summa*. Whereas the focus on Cathars' dualism diminished when they were brutally wiped off the map, William, Alexander, and Hugh's reasons against the Peripatetic view on eternity continued to draw attention among theologians fighting back “Averroism”.

KEYWORDS: Hugh of Saint-Cher, Aristotle, eternity, Cathars, divine dualism, *Sentences*.

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Framing the terms: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Manichean

One might wonder how it was possible to assemble those people in one text? All these authorities were picked by Hugh of Saint-Cher, an eminent Dominican 13th-century theologian, to challenge unorthodox views on the creation and temporality of the world unfolded in the first distinction of the second book dedicated to the commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*. In the present paper, I offer an introduction to his distinction followed by Latin transcription and English translation which have been fulfilled for the first time in Hugh of Saint-Cher's scholarship. I am going to flesh out Hugh's approach to two interconnected issues: the eternity and absolute divine duality represented substantially by ancient authorities and modern opponents covered up behind them. Evidently, every authority invoked by Hugh is not the same as we used to read and understand. Ancient philosophers and heretics in the medieval mirror could not retain their original beliefs. I argue that Hugh of Saint-Cher with the help from his senior fellows transformed the encountered philosophers and heretics into a new isomorphic complex responsible for the eternity of the world and the dualism of beginnings. Essentially, Aristotle's arguments were raised in support of Catharism, given that Stagyrte's philosophy underwent reinterpretation to command assent with the heretical binarism. Even Plato and Epicurus became intertwined within the discourse surrounding the Cathartic doctrine of the creation from eternal matter.

Before navigating through this entangled web of reception we need to address the background of Hugh's commentary, the intellectual milieu prevailing at Paris, and his forerunners. Hugh of Saint-Cher, born in ca. 1190 near Vienna, pursued the study of arts and canon law in the 1220-s when he also took Dominican vows. Subsequently, he turned to theology by 1225, defended and subsequently assembled from his ideas, oral lectures, and previous writings the commentary on the *Sentences*, the subject of our investigation, in 1231 under the supervision of Roland of Cremona who relinquished the chair at Paris for the sake of inquisitorial preaching against the Cathars. Having inherited his master's Dominican chair in theology, Hugh went on to teach at the university and undertook a project consecrated to the production of *Postillae* on the Bible at a recently established Dominican *studium* on the rue St. Jacques. In 1244 he ascended to the rank of cardinal and became increasingly absorbed in administrative errands until his demise in Orvieto in 1263¹.

His commentary commonly called *Opus* or *Scriptum* deviated from both the conventional literal expositions of the Bible and previous attempts to explicate Peter Lombard's *florilegium* — 4 books that feature a plethora of authoritative quotes

¹ A. Paravicini Bagliani (1972) 257–263.

retrieved above all from Augustine, Abelard, and Hugh of Saint-Victor on the Trinity, creation, Christian virtues, church sacraments, and last things — within the genre of *glossa* or *summa*. Whereas *glossae* tied Stephan Langton and Alexander of Hales to Peter's text and limited the scope of their investigation, *summae* composed by William of Auxerre and Philip the Chancellor drove their authors to problems not always connected with the structure and circuit of Lombard's manual. Hugh of Saint-Cher was the first theologian to graft onto the future scholasticism a commentary in the shape of viable text full of *questiones* which he diversified with glosses as a part of *lectio* setting forth the literal meaning of the text². During such a transitional stage of the Paris educational system prior to mid-century when the *Sentences* progressively turned into a standard textbook and garnered an official seal of approval, Hugh's glosses were designed to be read in conjunction with Peter Lombard's original text. As a result, Hugh abbreviated most of the occasional glosses drawn from Peter into brief indications consisting of one-two words “Stichwortglossen” that a bachelor who studied theology would instantly grasp and fathom in sharp contrast with the explanations in detail required for modern readers. Take as an example the last sentence of the present transcription in the form of Hugh's manuscript and its reconstruction accomplished by me to embrace how it would have been recognized by contemporary theologians:

The manuscript Vat. lat. 1098

Tradens per Moysen et ante tempora significat quomodo enim tempora crearet, si prius non esset exstitisse scilicet deum.

My reconstruction

Horum ergo et similium errorem spiritus sanctus euacuans, ueritatisque disciplinam tradens per Moysen, deum in principio temporum mundum creasse et ante tempora significat, quomodo enim tempora crearet, si prius non esset, eternaliter exstitisse, scilicet deum.

The reconstructed version is twice as long as the concise and pragmatic abbreviation, suggesting that glosses on Peter's text should be grappled together with his own work³, even though I have appended relevant quotes in the footnotes to accompany Hugh's transcription and recuperated them by translation. In any case, his approach inexorably laid the foundation for ensuing commentaries which gradually shifted from *expositiones litterales* of Lombard's text and focused instead on contemporary debates in the scholastic theology⁴.

² M. Bieniak (2009) 112.

³ Petrus Lombardus (1971) 329–332.

⁴ C. Angotti (2012) 201.

The Path Towards Scholastic Theology

For a long time, *theologia* had remained a doctrine akin to pagan philosophy that changed only with Abelard: within the 12th-century school advent, the notion was evolving into a dialectical domain of knowledge designed to confront heretics who contradicted the tenets of faith by appealing to the Scripture⁵. This advent of dialectics gave rise to scholastic theology which stretched a rational examination of theological problems as far as possible at medieval universities where issues concerning the eternity of the world and the number of creators were debated beyond dogmatic perennial refutations which Peter Lombard himself took up: to claim that Moses said *in principio creavit* answering pagan and heretic's argumentation was no longer sufficient⁶. Apparently, some scholastic arguments associated with eternity and dualism came from the Patristic philosophy invigorating scholasticism.

The Eastern Church Fathers spilled much ink in developing a body of arguments countering bothersome Aristotle's idea that the world was uncreated. The evolution of hexameron literature resulted in the assertion proving that the beginning of time exceeds the flow of time itself ἡ τοῦ χρόνου ἀρχὴ οὐπω χρόνος⁷. In his extant work, John Philoponus onwards went into matter in this assault by displaying that peripatetic time could not predate the creation of the heaven which is measured by a comprehending soul οὐκ ἦν ἄρα χρόνος πρὶν οὐρανὸν ὑποστῆναι, while eternity implies an infinite regress of time moments σημείον ... ἀδιάστατον καὶ ἀμερῆς⁸. Latin Fathers expressed more reservation in providing philosophical justification in defiance of eternity⁹ to such an extent that Ambrosius confined himself to recount Moses' life validating his wisdom and veracity as an author of Genesis, while Bede did not go beyond reiterating Gen. 1:1¹⁰. Furthermore, the prehistory of scholastic dialectical contribution against the Cathars bears resemblance to the state of polemics over eternity. The issue of dualism existed since the time of Marcion of Sinope and received formidable interest from Augustine among other prominent Fathers whose anti-Manichean corpus was not well-known in the Middle Ages as scholastics engaged in dialectical debates in northern France, particularly Alain of Lille, Alexander Neckam, Évrard of Béthune, William of Auxerre, and

⁵ A. Boureau (2007) 21–23.

⁶ Petrus Lombardus (1971) 330.

⁷ Basile de Césarée (1950) 110, 112; Gregorius Nyssenus (2009) 17–18.

⁸ Ioannes Philoponus (1897) 7–8.

⁹ R.C. Dales (1987) 171.

¹⁰ Ambrosius (1845) I.3.11; Beda Venerabilis (1862) 39.

Philip the Chancellor¹¹, had to devise new arguments in the face of the modern heretical polemicists shrouded under the ancient name of Manicheans¹². The spin of Church propaganda against the Cathars¹³ as well as the sole surviving metaphysical tractate composed by a Cathar dated back to the first decades of the 13th century which were coeval with Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Opus*¹⁴. That being the case, among Paris masters Hugh resided at the genesis of two vital debates that came to fruition with later friars who had to grapple with erroneous views.

At this point, searching for rational disputation against doctrines that question the authority of the Holy Scripture we encounter an early stage of scholastic theology at Paris. I do not seek to portray a medieval friar eager to express personal humility as a romantic author obsessed with novelty and authenticity which stokes the fires of the present-day consciousness¹⁵. I am going to place Hugh's distinction in the historical milieu to make clear whether and how he modified and reshaped traditional theological issues which he mostly adopted from William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales. However, I cannot justify in its entirety the antecedent claims proposed by researchers who accused Hugh of wholesale plagiarism, redoing the prose, and theft from earlier masters¹⁶. I suggest that their ultimate indictment which transmutes Hugh into an intellectual backwater of the second rate

¹¹ P. Biller (1999) 35, 46–49. The scholar also enlisted the *Summa contra hereticos* by early Paris master and chancellor Praepositinus of Cremona whose authorship nowadays has been dismissed in place of attribution to Peter of Verona. In the second book of his authentic *Summa*, Praepositinus passes over the problem of heretical and peripatetic stance of the creation to handle right away the angelic temporality, a prime subject of Peter Lombard's second distinction (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 14526, fol. 14v).

¹² G.G. Stroumsa (1992) 178. To my knowledge, Hugh only once speaks of *catharos* instead of *manicheos* (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 1098, fol. 35ra).

¹³ In line with the first canon of the Fourth Lateran Council which had denounced Catharic substantiation of evil Honorius III stressed that theologians and masters should take up theoretical arms to scrimmage heretics' stance (J.B. Russell (1984) 189; S.E. Young (2014) 30–31).

¹⁴ G.G. Stroumsa (1992) 173, 176–177.

¹⁵ L. Smith (2010) 255.

¹⁶ M. van der Lugt (2004) 263–266, 268; A. Boureau (2007) 59, 87–88. Professedly, I have no intention to undermine their groundbreaking studies but only to admonish against support to the rash conclusions towards stripping Hugh of any scholars' maintenance. As a matter of fact, the fourth book which encapsulates church sacraments and eschatology discloses "une nouveauté importante" according to A. Boureau who seven years later changed his attitude locating Hugh's innovatory role in the discussion over apocalyptic

does not hold true. At first glance, the Dominican recapitulates all William's arguments pro Aristotle and Manichean as well as reasons [24]¹⁷ and [27] contra dualists¹⁸, though almost all of his counterarguments either alter or totally differ from his predecessors that compels me to conclude that Hugh's autonomy in handling Aristotle and Manichean on the established surface of gathered arguments in favor of them or loan from oral lectures and undiscovered texts are equally possible scenarios. On top of that, Alexander champions Aristotle's authority and asserts that his "always" (*semper*) designates any time in time, a universal character of time moments and not eternity germane for God alone¹⁹. Hugh not only avoids including this part of Alexander's teaching but referencing on several occasions Aristotle by name in place of William's *magistri philosophi, scilicet peripatetici* and Alexander's anonymous proponents of the eternity further undermines Alexander's position with the argument [10] which regards the three-fold notion of *semper* applied exclusively to God.

Hugh's third talented forbear and chancellor of Notre Dame de Paris Philip poses more difficulties in assessing his impact on Hugh's *Scriptum*. Unfortunately, we do not dispose of accurate information regarding the date when he finished his *Summa de bono*. N. Wicki argues that Philip composed it between 1225–1228 before Alexander of Hales' gloss²⁰, although Alexander's editors and some scholars find it challenging to justify these time boundaries decisively²¹.

Even if we consent that Hugh did read *Summa de bono*, such a timeline will not betray my insistence that the Dominican friar prone to recur to William and Alexander introduced some novel counterarguments and more to the point a systematic approach to tackling jointly eternity and divine dualism. Given that the

fire purging nature from human vital activity or in the defense of the pontifical dispensation from a vow (A. Boureau (2014a) 62–65; A. Boureau (2014b) 58–63). Other researchers even deteriorated Hugh's reputation of an exegete by presuming without ample proof that he is a "figment of bibliographer's imagination" (L. Smith (2010) 246–252), whereas scholarship on his *Questiones* is more benevolent and balanced (J.-P. Torrell (1974) 108–109, 243–244; M. Bieniak (2010) 26, 36–40, 102–106; R. Saccenti (2010) 410–414).

¹⁷ The numbers in brackets throughout the paper conform to the division of Hugh's argumentative structure as indicated by me.

¹⁸ Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) App. I.1, App. I.3, VIII.1; Alexander de Hales (1952) I.3, I.6, I.13, I.23.

¹⁹ Ibid. I.15.

²⁰ N. Wicki (2005) 6.

²¹ M. Bieniak (2010) 109–112; N. Gorochov (2021) 155.

Summa incarnates a project of epistemological inward attack on the dualism assaulted by the former inquisitor active in Southern France²², Philip's critique of the Cathars in the section roughly corresponding to the beginning of Lombard's second book significantly differs from the present transcription flourishing on the ontological arguments. Philip states that 1) two beginnings of evil and good must belong to two different genera which are deemed impossible since genus does not produce beginnings of things; 2) evil cannot be none other than privation of good; 3) the highest evil would be more perfect if it lacked the good that renders the highest evil imperfect; 4) an evil body and a good soul cannot originate from two divinities, particularly in the context of Christ's two natures²³. The only similarity I can identify is Anselm's formula of the highest good *quo melius excogitari non potest* also mentioned by Alexander. Philip pinpoints that the highest good in opposition to the highest evil could be amended by simplicity *simplicitatem addita* confuting the initial definition of the highest good²⁴ which does not accord with Hugh who expands his grip on the same expression differently. Moreover, Philip and Hugh's positions on Plato and Aristotle sail past each other. In proximity to Alexander, Philip explains away Aristotle's worldview by substituting eternity with the perpetual duration of the created world *mundum esse perpetuum et non eternum*²⁵. The Paris Chancellor endorses the argument that in a perpetual world a beginning is still necessary because perpetuity does not preclude the existence of the beginning²⁶. Both Plato and Aristotle are understood to assert the eternity of the world merely in the divine mind which aims to create it eternally²⁷. The final proof *deus ab eterno uoluit et potuit, et sciuit facere* resonates for the second time with the proposition in Hugh's transcription, though the Dominican perhaps rejects and redefines Chancellor's assumption in turn. I dare to argue two versions of events could have taken hold: 1) if Philip wrote *Summa* before Hugh, then the Dominican theologian would correct the Chancellor and denounce Aristotle's amalgamation within Christian creationism; 2) alternatively, Hugh's hostility toward new translations would imbue Philip to think out how to reconcile the Stagyrte with Moses, had Philip finished his opus after Hugh. Be that as it may, we should dive into the genealogy, structure, and philosophical content of Hugh's approach.

²² L.-H. Barichard (2012) 16, 98; R. Saccenti (2013) 10.

²³ Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 7669, fols. 5va–6rb.

²⁴ Ibid. fol. 6ra.

²⁵ Ibid. fol. 6va.

²⁶ Ibid. fols. 6vb–7ra

²⁷ Ibid. fol. 7rb.

Aristotle-Heretic

Hugh of Saint-Cher's distinction summons four authorities to refute: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Manichean who all commit an error related to the beginning of the world *principium* [2]. By thoroughly envisaging the arguments advanced by Hugh's adversaries, I will cast light on the elements that form a cohesive conjunction of all *auctoritates* into one isomorphism erected on the ground of dualism and eternity. It is not fortuitous that even at the beginning of Hugh's distinction the deliberate arrangement of four foes in the consecutive order serves to eloquently underscore the kinship of those under delusion eliminated by Moses.

There is no argument that the authenticity rarely bothered medieval scholars but inquiring in such matters remains crucial for apprehending the historiography of various authorities within a specific tradition. In the case of Plato, as one might expect, his initial assertion that being, place, and becoming come into existence before heaven ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι, τρία τριχῆ, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι²⁸ differs from Hugh's treatment of the "platonian ontology" detached from the Greek text. Hugh attributes to the Hellenic philosopher *ydeas, yle et artificem* and aligns with Calcidius' commentary echoed by Peter Lombard and Petrus Comestor²⁹ who by doing so denounces the School of Chartres' adherence to the *Timaeus*³⁰.

Hugh dogmatically disavows the conception allegedly held by Plato and Epicurus that God creates acting on the eternal matter with an old argument according to which creating in a proper sense *creare* signifies making from nothing *de nichilo aliquid facere* [11]. Philosophers assume God to be a human-like agent that would make his absolute power conditioned *omnipotens non esset*. Hugh specifies that platonian God resembles a human or angelic producer *factor* who works upon adjacent matter *ex preiacenti materia* [29], once again a distinctive feature of Thierry of Chartres' approach to the platonized creation from matter waiting to be put into use³¹. In Abelardian theology, the terms "create" *creare* and "make" *facere* entail the same meaning but have different connotations when applied to the divine essence and accidental creatures. In God, to create denotes the necessary will from which the temporal effect proceeds *uoluntatem eius necessario sequitur effectus* [30]. Thus, reducing divine power to the status of a demiurge would add an accidental

²⁸ Plato (1902) 52d.

²⁹ M.J. Clark (2005) 128; Petrus Lombardus (1971) 330.

³⁰ Plato (1962) 51.6–7; P.W. Rosemann (2004) 94; M.J. Clark (2005) 128. It is no coincidence that this path aimed at deciphering the *Timaeus* prompted William of Conches to claim the sempiternity of the world. The world begins with time but does not have an end as well as approval from later scholastics like Hugh (P. Porro (1996) 88–90).

³¹ P. Dronke (1988) 375.

property that ties God with creatures and destroys the difference between voluntary creation and production which renders the creature's relation to God in time. Augustine summoned against the Greeks claims that God cannot become a cause of human degradation without a corresponding human decline whence Hugh distinguishes two meanings. *Ad litteram* reading approves that eternal volition presumes an upright action and outcome. God could want eternally and bring about the world at a particular moment of time. The figurative sense concerns exclusively human discourse wherein only the human relation *habitus* undergoes a change, while divine unity remains unaltered. God appertains to different things in the same manner but creatures are prone to modify their attitude. In a nutshell, what God creates eternally and voluntarily without movement or change reflects a temporal and accidental production from the creatures' perspective.

Likewise, Epicurus' account of infinite beginnings and eternal matter is refuted together with Plato's proclaimed edifice and at first glance poses no difficulty. Pierre le Mangeur's implantation of Epicurus in Genesis might elucidate why Hugh familiar with Comestor decides to call on Epicurus³², though it fails to unravel why Epicurus insists on the divine creation from matter in place of atoms and void, as acknowledged by both Comestor and William of Auxerre later³³. An alternative explanation for the role Plato and Epicurus play would make more sense: the Cathars mounted a defense of the proclaimed Plato-Epicurus' position by making use of similar expressions *creare sicut facere*, *factor*, and *ex preiacenti materia* when referring to God [29]³⁴. The learned Cathars presumably voiced these ideas in the *Liber de duobus principiis* composed by a disciple of Jean de Lugio, that is a "full-blooded" heretical intellectual, in the 1230-s. I cannot eliminate the possibility that Jean's teaching reached Paris before his lectures were compiled into the text we know nowadays as we have some evidence from the scholars acknowledging Cathar's "artistic" appeal to dialectics and philosophy³⁵. However the testimonies of actual Catharic learning are to be explained, addressing the roots of the heretical position found in the Antiquity would outbalance dealing with contemporary heretics, even if they de facto knew Aristotle beyond *Liber de causis*. This treatment of authorities also lights up the integration of Aristotle into Cathars' discourse.

The exposition of Aristotle's vindication of eternity is not devoid of inherent ambiguity [3]. Aside from relying on William and Alexander's words, Hugh could have direct access to Aristotle's perspective on eternity via translations of "Physics"

³² M.J. Clark (2005) 128.

³³ Guillermus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1.

³⁴ Anonyme (1973) 228–229; 246.

³⁵ P. Biller (1999) 40, 43–44, 48–49.

and Averroes' "Long Commentary on the Metaphysics" where a clear original expression that denotes infinite time *ἄπειρον χρόνον* was substituted by *infatigabile* in Aristotle³⁶ and *non accidit ei fatigacio* in Averroes³⁷. Meanwhile, a coincident suspicion of Aristotle's innocent creationism, albeit in passing, betrays a hint of caution in Hugh's commentary on Petrus Comestor's *Historia scholastica* (1230–1235): here the Parisian master (taking a retreat and surrendering himself to Alexander-Philip's camp?) explicitly resists the line of interpretation according to which Aristotle corroborates the eternal existence of the world *operatur sine fine* contrary to what Comestor suggests that begs the question³⁸. In that space of time, Hugh might have changed his opinion upside-down or underlined an equivocal distinction between Arabic influence and innocuous Aristotle that seems quite unlikely. Otherwise, I cannot rule out that someone within Hugh's team at St. Jacques immersed in preparing the commentary pushed forward such an exoneration of Aristotle.

Anyway, I point your attention to the fact that in the *Opus* Hugh articulately ventures an objection to Aristotle accompanied by anonymous followers *qui, cum eo ponunt* [3], if he does not resort to a mere rhetorical device, that might cover a vestige of Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, and unknown members of the faculty of arts³⁹ who could have embarked on redeeming Aristotle before Hugh and fueled the theological reaction. Both Hugh's contemporaries and his personal acquaintance with Aristotle's books fostered discussions and the initial dialectical rebuttal of eternity in the *Sentences* defended in 1231 precisely when Gregory IX lifted the ban over reading Aristotle's *Libri naturales* at the faculty of arts to turn away theologians from peripatetic philosophy⁴⁰.

At first, a reader might assume that Hugh's opposition to Aristotle revolves around the problem of three peripatetic beginnings⁴¹, namely matter, form, and operator *materia, forma et operatorium dictum* [29] which again represents the Chartres' doctrine Peter Lombard aims to attack⁴². Hugh then pushes forward that these principles can be reduced to two causes of the creation: one passive and the other active. Neither Peter Lombard nor Stephen Langton and Alexander of Hales suggest such a reduction to two beginnings that brings concord between Aristotle

³⁶ Aristoteles (1951) 252a13; Aristoteles (1990) VIII.1.

³⁷ Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 2435, fol. 122r.

³⁸ Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, MS 1401, fol. 158rb.

³⁹ It might be well-known artists like Richard Rufus and John Pagus (N. Gorochov (2012) 421).

⁴⁰ L.M. Bianchi (2005) 110–111. Relying on Roger Bacon's posterior testimony, M. Grabmann goes as far as to suppose that the initial interdiction over Aristotle's natural philosophy in 1210 was engendered by the fear of the world's eternity (M. Grabmann (1941) 55–57).

⁴¹ Aristoteles (1997) IX.1.

⁴² M.L. Colish (1994) 337.

and Manichean's outlooks. It deserves highlighting that for the Cathars God along with matter and form preceded the world in eternity⁴³ that corresponds to reinterpreted Aristotle who invokes two beginnings instead of three. Only the fact that the Cathars accept three consecutive creations which Hugh totally elides would discern them from Aristotle's conception of the eternal uncreated world.

Onwards, I suppose that Hugh continues to discredit Aristotle by inchoately speculating on the ambivalence of the notion *dictum* in relation to *operatorium* [31]. When induced by Lombard, Latin *dictum* can be interpreted as either an adjective or a noun. On the one hand, taken as an adjective describing *operatorium*, it contradicts the catholic faith since God finds himself called operator who acts on existing matter. On the other hand, assumed to be a noun, *dictione operatorium* embodies the Christian conception of divine creation through saying and creating simultaneously, as exemplified by the famous repetition of *dixit* in Genesis, although the second beginning remains coeternal with operator still not equal to Christian God.

These passages bear a resemblance to literal *glossae* on Peter's text providing the reader with an easily accessible clarification of the text Hugh refills with new questions which expand beyond Lombard's scope⁴⁴. The nexus of the polemics over Aristotle comprises four arguments and three suitable counterarguments. In lieu of glosses, Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Opus II.1* furnishes a sample of early university dialectics embodied by William and Alexander when one adduces several reasons to be demolished in light of the author's position. Aristotle's philosophy sparks the first series of arguments and counterarguments. [3] Having cited the second book of "On the Generation and Corruption" where Aristotle claims that "everything which has a likeness to itself is inborn to produce everything similar", theologians conclude that the beginning of the world as the first cause *prima causa* must exist from eternity (*ab eterno fuit principium mundi*). If God is eternal, then everything he creates should possess identical qualities. The second argument [4] echoes William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, and Philip the Chancellor's claims according to which potency, knowledge, and will required to create something were in God in eternity, therefore, he could create and in fact he created eternally. The argument transitions from potency which is not temporal since time has not yet come into existence to the actual state of the coeternal world. Next proposition [5] draws

⁴³ Anonyme (1973) 80.

⁴⁴ Contrary to R. Friedman falling victim to the assumption that early *Sentences* before 1250 remained in the scholastic bud, I am adamant that they gradually relieved from *littera* toward autonomous questions which Hugh propelled by preferring running commentary to glosses (cf. R.L. Friedman (2002) 41, 88). I will exemplify later the continuity between early scholastic masters and mid-century "giants" by tracing back specific questions.

upon the authority of Augustine whose quote “we exist because God is good” the masters leverage to the temporal modality: God is eternally good and, consequently, we retain the same eternal predicate. [6] By equating God with the neoplatonic highest good which outflows down to the level of corporal creatures, *opponens* infers that eternal emanation results in the world itself, hence the world must exist forever (*ab eterno fluxit, sed eius effluxio nichil aliud est quam mundi*).

The inclusion of the term *effluxio* in the final argument indebted to pseudo-Dionysius' *De divinis nominibus* resonates with the first argument where they appeal to *prima causa*. Both notions stem from the Arabic assimilation of Aristotle and not from Augustine's terminology, as William suggests⁴⁵. In all likelihood, these Latin notions representing Arabic *fayḍ* and *al-'illa al-ūlā* made their debut in the translation carried out by Gerard of Cremona of the *Liber de causis*, a pseudo-Aristotle's paraphrase extracted from Proclus⁴⁶. I presume William and afterwards Alexander with Hugh avouch to unspecified *fontes*, as at least Avicenna and Avicenna in conjunction with their Spanish translator Dominicus Gundissalinus harmonized Aristotle's teaching with neoplatonic principles of the first cause and the emanation of the good fluxing onto intelligences, thereby creating the world in virtue of their mediation⁴⁷. Furthermore, in 1982 R.A. Gauthier revealed that Hugh could have cited Averroes' metaphysical commentary to draw a boundary between the motion of physical bodies and the metaphysical movement of angels, *ipso facto* encapsulating the nascent theological tenets of Averroes' authority which had plagued Paris from 1225⁴⁸. Nonetheless, distinctions II.1–2 reckon an opposite trend. In the second distinction, the Dominican discards Aristotle's conception of eternity within his explication of time as a succession of moments. No time flow would take place for no action and no movement could transpire in eternity being the state of unchanging things *status permanens in eodem esse*⁴⁹. In the present distinction, *responsio* and three counterarguments bring to ruin the neoplatonized vindication of eternity which lured both Alexander and Philip.

The friar wards off [7] that the world made from necessity must have a beginning in time. [8] The principle of production of the same by the same functions exclusively in the natural order (*tenet in naturalis*) and does not amount to voluntary agents who operate beyond the constraints of physics. In Hugh's view, metaphysical agents acting with free will like separated souls, angels, and God are not

⁴⁵ Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) App. I.3.

⁴⁶ O. Lizzini (2013) 131–132.

⁴⁷ Avencebrolis (1892) 109–110; Avicenna (1977) 98, 216; N. Polloni (2015) 91–92.

⁴⁸ R.A. Gauthier (1982) 346.

⁴⁹ Vat. lat. 1098, fol. 47rb.

bound by the necessity that Aristotle's reasoning requires. [9] On the footing of the *Summa aurea*, Hugh contends that God as the voluntary cause with a delayed effect *dilatatoria* chooses *prelegit* the moment when the world will have been created, unlike creatures who desire and make immediately. To enhance the point, the Dominican goes on claim that the proposition “God desired to make the world from eternity, thus he made it thereby” has different meanings being composed and divided, a celebrated fallacy classified by Aristotle in the *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. Hugh implies the following self-contradiction: his opponents fall short to logically justify a transition from the eternal will to the act of creation itself, hence the will signifies a potency that does not necessarily correspond to action in quality and time. Divided, the temporality of the will would differ from the act of creation, while composed, it would sound that both proceed from eternity. To back up the orthodoxy, the Dominican efficiently combines authority of his predecessors and logic circumventing a proposition reminiscent of Philip through Aristotle⁵⁰. Passing by the third reason Hugh abruptly shifts an inconclusive discussion to investigate tout à coup the issue of emanation. If I were a theologian addressing Augustine's quote, I would suggest that divine goodness and our goodness are said equivocally because divine goodness, being the cause of our existence, cannot mirror creatures who would then become semi-gods which goes against divine omnipotence and unicity. Moreover, Augustine emphasizes that these two *bonitates* are not the same: we aspire to his goodness and God uses us *usum nostrum refert* for his own goodness which is supreme transcending our existence⁵¹. [10] The last counterargument revises emanation through the lens of the three actions apt to the Trinity *summe bonitatis triplex est effluxio*, namely Son's generation, Spirit's spiration, and Father's creation. The highest perfection always participates in the generation and spiration, though the creation occurs in time as we have already seen that God desires to create eternally by choosing one germane moment. Thereby, our world is a small drop of divine goodness *parua stilla bonitatis dei* not venting the totality of the divine perfection embodied in the Trinity. Generally, creation can only be accidentally attributed to creatures because it contravenes divine eternity and the highest goodness.

Amid the three ancient sages discussed, though Hugh connects Plato and Epicurus with issues concerning eternal matter and divine predication which touch the friar in relation to Cathars' metaphysics, like a cornerstone Aristotle captures

⁵⁰A parallel can be drawn between Hugh's feasible hostile relationship with Philip-Alexander and the acrimonious critique of Robert Grosseteste directed in opposition to both elder professors (R.C. Dales (1989) 71).

⁵¹ Aurelius Augustinus (1995) 32.34–35.

all the vigor and attention paid to gainsay his arguments presented by his progenitors. It is Aristotle alongside the flood of his Arabic and scholastic proponents (their precise list remains illegible) who occupies the place of the villain in this Paris narrative. After all, the Dominican succeeds in what Aristotle resembles Cathars' eternal dualism. Hugh's contribution extends beyond Aristotle-Heretic since our theologian takes into consideration Manichean-Peripatetic from a philosophical point of view encompassing a more comprehensive exploration of the issues at hand.

Manichean-Peripatetic

Stricto sensu heresy (αἵρεσις) denotes a choice regarding Christian dogmas and Scripture reading condemned by councils. So, to demonstrate the disparity between the Bible and its heretical interpretation would be a straightforward means to assail the heretic's stronghold. Nevertheless, in this distinction, Hugh's generation opts for a strategy I have called afore scholastic theology wherein he systematically and rationally proves that Manichean's arguments for two beginnings, namely good and evil gods, lack philosophical foundation [2, 12] as if Manichean were Aristotle. Playing the devil's advocate, Hugh starts by delivering three already designed arguments that Manichean might propose to secure his position. In the *Quoniam homines* and *De fide catholica*, Alain of Lille had come up with the reasons [13] and [14] which then adjusted William of Auxerre, while the [15] Aristotelian idea invoked for the first time by John Blund appeared in connection with heretics only in the *Summa aurea* antedating Hugh⁵². Foremost [13], invariable causes result in immutable effects. Analogically, the invariable good could not create a variable or visible. Goodness must remain good within itself since a change of any ilk would imply that it does not have a good inside and seeks something external. [14] Nothing could pretend to be the cause of the creation and destruction of the same. If God created evil people, he would not be able to eradicate them. This limping proposition [14] raises a variety of issues overly easy to dismiss. It imposes stark limitations on the divine omnipotence and makes God the cause of evil beings which clashes with the initial Manichean's premise that all evil originates from malevolent God. Ultimately [15], opposite things give rise to mutual oppositions, then a good God can only create good things and something else is required to account for the existence of evil entities. Again, this reasoning in line with the broader Cathartic logic diminishes the divine power to create.

When I finished the transcription, what William and Hugh's Manichean had referenced Aristotle went unnoticed. In the first instance, the citation has been

⁵² P. Biller (1999) 37–40, 52–53.

identified in the *Summa aurea* by P. Biller who held forth that the Cathars themselves might have alluded to the *De generatione et corruptione* without any robust testimony on the side of their discourse⁵³. Albeit the general correctness of the reference and the fact that Hugh quotes this work, the proposition *contrariorum contraria sunt principia* [15] reiterates a celebrated idea as well found in the “Metaphysics”⁵⁴ that being and substance *entia et substancia*, one and many *unum et multa*, heat and cold *calidum et frigidum* like all beginnings are opposite principles *principia sunt contraria* rendering without significant alteration original τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας. Moreover, being, a fundamental object of the metaphysical inquiry *unius scientia*, manifests itself as either opposites or things that arise from opposites *aut sunt contraria, aut ex contrariis*⁵⁵. Save that William of Auxerre might have been a pioneering theologian in citing Aristotle-Averroes’ “Metaphysics”⁵⁶, William utilized the same as in Aristotle’s tractate example of heat and cold omitted by Hugh⁵⁷. The reception of the first philosophy not only attests to the position as regards the early influence noted by Gauthier but also sustains my approach to the merger of Aristotle and Manichean: Aristotelianism speaks for Catharism prior to being dismissed by the theologians. By associating contemporary heretics with Greek philosophers, it becomes easier to discredit their beliefs. The Dominican, much like scholastic theologians of his time, implements a common strategy of constructing a figurative representation by borrowing elements from different standpoints which he then accommodates to effectively dismantle and refute all of them.

In response, Hugh takes off the kid gloves to furnish his counterarguments. [16] is valid exclusively in causes connected with their effects *in causis coniunctis suis effectibus*. This does not serve universally so far as a cause does not necessarily coincide with its effect: for instance, a living being can create a house deprived of what we commonly expect from animated creatures. God as well does not produce creatures who would correspond to his attributes including immutability. Furthermore, motion and mutation are caused by the motionless and immutable divine

⁵³ Ibid. 36, 49; Aristoteles (1997) IX.1.

⁵⁴ Barichard came forward with a similar reference to Aristotle’s *Praedicamenta* and Boethius carried out by Philip the Chancellor to synthesize an inadmissible dualistic epistemology of binary opposition where one element invariably lets down the Manicheans (L.-H. Barichard (2012) 86–87).

⁵⁵ Aristoteles (1957) 1004b; Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque de l’Agglomération de Saint Omer, MS 595, fol. 30r. What is more, the old version of the “Metaphysics” may have been available where the Cathars were supposed to preach and teach (N. Gorochov (2012) 177–182).

⁵⁶ R.A. Gauthier (1982) 340–344.

⁵⁷ Guillermus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1.

substance. To initiate a motion a certain element in the chain of moving things should remain at rest; otherwise, a Cathar would find himself trapped in an infinite regress. Hugh's ensuing reason [17] does not prove true for voluntary agents as in the case of an artisan who has the ability to destroy the same thing he made before. Therefore, it falls within God's dominion to willingly create someone who is not equal to his majesty and whom he is in power to thwart. [18] Holding the trump card Hugh incorporates Aristotle against Aristotle in contrast with William who starts with the tantamount *primis contrariis* and then proceeds that bad cannot secure a positive attribute other than nothing and privation of good: according to Hugh, first opposite things should have a common origin to avoid an infinite regress *processus esset infinitum*, a celebrated Aristotelian argument originally employed against Zeno's actual infinity⁵⁸. If on every succeeding level two opposite things stem from opposites without a principle they share, there would be no end in the circuit of causes that contradicts even heretical binarism of beginnings. Alternatively, if each multiplied opposition were to account for an independent beginning, the number of principles would equal the number of opposites *tot essent principia, quot sunt contraria* which goes against Manichean's dualism as well.

The obtrusive and abrupt intermezzo of glosses [19] precedes Hugh's counter-response and arguments which carry on a new spin of the discussion [20]. That said, the Dominican friar is committed to acknowledging [21] that the uniqueness of God's essence leaves no room for another equal principle to coexist. The superabundance of God's nature estranges any possibility of something similar existing side by side with him. In his pursuit of truth, a genuine theologian should exhaust all the possibilities to obtain the truth, so Hugh advises to [22] imagine the multiplicity of the highest goods as a logical counterpart of the Cathar's dualism. For Hugh, these highest goods must stay different; otherwise, they would fall into one and the same highest good and lose their identity. Each highest good should differ from another in possessing a particular quality that another highest good would not possess. However, this quality could not be anything else than good itself since any highest good contains only things that are good. Consequently, if one highest good were to obtain a particular good that another highest good did not have *alio bono careret*, the second beginning would not meet the criterion for the highest good. There is no reason for supposing manifold good beginnings.

⁵⁸ Aristoteles (1990) III.6. Later, on the borderline of orthodoxy this aspect of Aristotle's teaching provided Roger Bacon with the underpinning to reject the eternity of the world. Bacon argued that Aristotle's notion of creation ran counter to Averroes who contaminated and distorted Stagirite's mindset, rather than suggesting that Aristotle himself had betrayed his own principles, as Hugh of Saint-Cher had already hinted (L.M. Bianchi (2013) 137).

Beyond that, maneuvering forward in the stream of discussion, the heretics exegetically excogitate [23] that an evil God created the heavens and all visible things enlisted by Moses in the book of Genesis. Hugh fends off [24] that by their definition God is one better than which could not be thought. To what his visionary adversary [25] raises an objection according to which two beginnings exist since two oppositions cannot share the same root turning us back to the third argument proposed by a far-fetched rival [15].

As we move into, Hugh continues this mental ping pong to secure a victory in this dispute akin to a Russian doll by the level of complexity that would try the reader's patience. The fact that Hugh's dualistic *opponens* has survived up to the fourth circle of the iteration bears witness to an unprecedented involution compared to his less intricate distinctions. Back to the disputation, jumping from a springboard erected on William and Alexander's considerations that an ability to resist bad is good itself⁵⁹ Hugh brings up the following [27]: if the good God were unable to overcome evil with good, he would be deprived of this goodness and would no longer maintain his status as the highest good. Up to this moment, the master has clung for the second time to Boethius-Anselm's enunciation "better than which nothing greater can be conceived" put to use in the same context by Alexander of Hales and Philip the Chancellor as a definition Manichean adapts to the good God⁶⁰. Notably, I cannot detect a resembling formula in the existing Cathar's corpus. I expect that our theologians might have thought out this embellished straw man based on the notion of the highest good which cannot exist without being greater than conceivable goodness. Hugh also leaves open another possibility from [27] to excoriate that God could restrain evil since it would strip the evil God of his sovereignty. The second ramification [28] provides an advanced retaliation when Hugh ascertains that the capacity to tackle evil is the power of good itself. Ergo, one of the gods does not bear anymore the status of the highest and Manichean in a monotheistic pitfall has to approve either the good or the bad God.

Historically, the Manichean position may sound more appealing and straightforward to comprehend than the divine creation and ensuing fall of evil angels which enkindled numerous scholastic strifes⁶¹. Notwithstanding, William, Alexander, and Hugh have efficiently displayed that God *a priori* should be unique and single. Even if God were the highest evil, he would still remain the only highest evil.

⁵⁹ Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1; Alexander de Hales (1952) I.6.b.

⁶⁰ Ibid. I.6.a; Vat. lat. 7669, fol. 6ra.

⁶¹ Both the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 and the condemnation of 1241/4 endeavoured to set the stage for angelology and sound theodicy presumably versus John Pagus and Alexander of Hales who came close to assuming the divine creation of demons (D. Grice (2019) 147, 215–216).

The Afterlife of Isomorphism

In the title, the word “between” marks the mutual chiasm of eternity and dualism. Hugh introduces significant amendments to both the genre of the *Sentences* and the questions over which a theologian should enter into consideration. Whatever historical impeachment was issued against Hugh before, armed with Alexander and William's insights the friar has turned what was previously restricted to a gulf between wrongheaded and Moses into a new plane of abstract and sophisticated uprooting of two interlocking problems: eternity and divine dualism. Founded on the divine voluntary essence distinct from natural agents and the world itself, the first set of seven proofs and counterarguments challenges the conception of the eternal world held by Aristotle, Arabs, and Peripatetics. The second impressive list of thirteen reasons suffices to aplenty bring an end to Manichean's stonewalling against which Hugh calls on a variety of arguments centered on the ontological incongruity between divine omnipotence and heretical binarism. I presume the friar entwines a convoluted array of anti-Christian foes into a cohesive isomorphism wherein Plato with Epicurus answer for the Cathar's reduction of *creare* to *facere ex materia*, Aristotle endorses dualism, and Manichean maintains the “metaphysics” of opposites. In the aftermath, his toil has withstood the test of time: forty copies of the *Opus* have come down to us outnumbering even Alexander of Hales' *Sentences*⁶², whilst Hugh's œuvre served as the grist to the mill for an educational manual “On the Ground” *Filia Magistri*⁶³ not to mention several anonymous writings⁶⁴, mendicant preaching⁶⁵, and alleged John of la Rochlle's *Sentences* where the repetition of Hugh de verbo follows an advanced elaboration on the different approaches to eternity introduced through Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, Avicenna, and Averroes. A precise reprint in the case of the Manicheans prepares a covered attack on Hugh's critique of Aristotle. On the surface, John of la Rochelle reiterates four of Hugh's arguments. Notwithstanding, the Franciscan turns around these tenets contrary to anonymous eternity proponents and not against innocent Aristotle who is acknowledged to believe the world to be everlasting *sempiternus* or *perpetuus*. Not to mention that John equates Aristotle-Hugh's *operatorium* with *deum*,

⁶² M. Bieniak (2009) 114–115.

⁶³ This early manuscript belongs to a textual family that is known for its fluidity and volatility. It contains an abridged version of Hugh's paraphrase that lacks any dialectical discussion and remarkably overleaps the engagement with Manichean arguments (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 16412, fols. 51va–52ra).

⁶⁴ J.-P. Torrell (1974) 267–269; M. Bieniak (2007) 162–164.

⁶⁵ L.-J. Bataillon (2004) 500.

he also completes the counterargument grounded on Augustine [5] with the causality of goodness and furnishes two additional reasons about coeternity and eternal matter. I cannot avoid mentioning that, while sabotaging the anti-Aristotelian camp, John also takes pains to accomplish an impressive synthesis of authorities to decipher Gen. 1:1 with the help of philosophical tools⁶⁶.

I have discovered that problems illuminated in the present distinction set up a precedent and without sinking into oblivion continued to attract the attention of masters thereafter Hugh had departed from the university. As scholastics did not favor citing their myriad contemporaries by name, approaching later authors I search for similar anonymous questions, arguments, and chiasm structuring anti-Catharic literature as well as later *Sentences* manuscripts of Odo Rigaud and Peter Aureol which await to be edited. Hugh's fruitful reasoning reverberated to some extent in the aforementioned theologians who propagated multifarious strategies to discuss not only Manichean but also Aristotle and his proponents. Besides, what three foreground representatives of “la nouvelle théologie” Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas⁶⁷ in their *Sentences* (approx. 1245–1257) were affected by threads of the chiasm splicing Aristotle and Manichean goes without saying⁶⁸ but more consideration should be devoted to figures who were overshadowed

⁶⁶ Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 691, fol. 54r–55v.

⁶⁷ On the repercussion of Hugh's prophetic theory in Gueric and Thomas' minds see J.-P. Torrell (1974) 273–280.

⁶⁸ Thanks to Hugh functioning as a conduit, Albert the Great held that Aristotle's three beginnings can be explicated as two. The only correction *Doctor universalis* made consisted of purging Epicurus from belief in eternity proclaimed by Hugh. This testifies to young Albert's lesser expertise in Aristotle (Albertus Magnus (1894) lib. II, d. 1, a. II.4; a. XI, sol.). The Stagirite had never endorsed anything resembling an operating principle. This fact was already obvious for Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers (1160s) who pointed that Aristotle's three beginnings were proclaimed by someone to be stated in the “Metaphysics” *Aristotelem dixisse in metaphysi<ca>*. Nevertheless, the anonymous theologian was quite adamant that the examination of Aristotle's text cannot corroborate this (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, MS lat. 14423, fol. 65va). Not only such an account vouches for the earlier fragmentary knowledge of “Metaphysics” but also bears out the critical and fair-minded approach of the Latins to “Aristotle”. Pseudo-Peter was not alone. The senior master in arts and eminent logician John Pagus pursued his theology degree at Paris roughly a year before Albert's arrival. Without hesitation, John annunciated for the sake of authenticity that Aristotle's “Physics” enclosed only “three beginnings: matter, form, and privation” *tria principia: materiam, formam et priuationem*. The master as well redeemed Aristotle because these beginnings do not contradict one beginning common to all and eternity has three different meanings predicated of various subjects (Paris, Bibliothèque

by successors, less studied by scholars, and yet magnifying our ignorance paved the way for a body of thought labeled as scholastic “vanguard”⁶⁹ who even took the genre quintessence of their *divisio textus* which consists of several questions and at the end exposition of Peter Lombard's phrasing exemplified by early scholastics Richard Rufus and Odo Rigaud⁷⁰. My modest contribution supplements an established by L. Bianchi and R. Dales overview of the debates over eternity. However, their splendid and distinguished survey did not include the texts I display here nor did it cover the associated issue of dualism⁷¹. Inside the *Sentences* composed environ 1245, in conformity with Alexander and Hugh Odo Rigaud rehearses three divine eternal predicates and Augustine's argument about divine goodness in correlation with our existence⁷². Concerning Manichean, he says that opposite beginnings produce contrary phenomena such as preservation and destruction and that good is a power to restrain evil (*potestas cohibendi mala*)⁷³. Presented ideas, indeed, reached the shore of England when Richard Rufus in the Oxfordian *Lectura* iterated that like begets like and the world was eternally creatable *creabilis* and knowable *subiectus sciendi* before being temporally created. Despite this, the Franciscan friar vanished off the Cathars from the distinction and delivered a totally different speculation about eternity through *primum nunc* later condemned

nationale de France, MS lat. 15652, fol. 53rb). By mischance, John was condemned and revised his teaching. He had next to no influence over future masters who promoted Hugh's ideas. Bonaventure, a vehement admirer of the condemnation of 1241/4, fulfilled both arguments regarding contraries and the production of similar from the similar. He embraced Hugh's solution which suggests that Manichean's reasoning applies solely to causes related to their effects. Furthermore, *Doctor Seraphicus* excogitated how even four of Aristotle's beginnings could be reduced to two (Bonaventura (1938) lib. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 1, q. I, ob. 4–5; dub. III resp.). Ultimately, Thomas discussed opposite beginnings but did not explicitly mention Manichean whom he refuted merely in a doctrinal manner. He introduced a rapture into Hugh's model and cogently stated that for Aristotle the beginning is singular and unique (Thomas de Aquino (1856) lib. II, d. 1, q. I, a. 1.1–2; *expositio textus*). The eminent masters trod in Hugh's footsteps deliberating the same isomorphism until *Doctor Angelicus* who intentionally strived to reconcile Aristotle with monotheism.

⁶⁹ Even historically speaking, our OP cardinal executed an intercession that enabled Thomas to begin his studies at Paris.

⁷⁰ See Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 5982, fol. 82r; Oxford, Balliol College MS 62, fol. 106rb–106vb.

⁷¹ L.M. Bianchi (1984) 115–116, 143; R.C. Dales (1989) 57–81.

⁷² Vat. lat. 5982, fol. 79rb–79vb. Nevertheless, he is at pains to rehabilitate Aristotle (Ibid. fol. 78ra).

⁷³ Ibid. fol. 78va.

at Paris⁷⁴. Both aforementioned *Sentences* from time to time march in lockstep with Hugh and his masters' isomorphism better exemplified in anti-heretical tractates.

Dominican Moneta of Cremona integrated Aristotle's eternity into Cathar's intellectual agenda⁷⁵. He played a prominent role as William and potentially Hugh's successor on several occasions. Nevertheless, I cast doubt on P. Biller's suggestion that Roland of Cremona functioned as a mediator between Parisian theology and Italian inquisition⁷⁶. Such a theory is disrupted due to factual incongruities regarding Roland (the date and place of the composition of his *Summa* are definitely after 1228 and outside of Paris) that the scholar commits. Given that Roland does concede to arguments similar to William and Hugh, his formulas for immutability, contraries, and divine will to make the world differ from those employed by Paris master and Moneta⁷⁷. What is more, Roland's *Summa* is inimitably exceptional for idiosyncratic arguments derived from natural philosophy and imagination. Roland invents unique and exceptional arguments while mocking that Aristotle took a vulnerable view regarding eternity just to insult Plato⁷⁸. For instance, if the world were to be eternal, there would be an infinite human population without a limit, so that God would cease to endow bodies with rational souls whose number is finite. Take another example, Noah's flood, which took place 10000 years ago according to Roland's calculations, affected terrestrial fertility and transformed human eating habits but it was the one-of-a-kind event determined by celestial constellation. Nonetheless, be the world perpetual, all motions and phenomena must be repeated unceasingly⁷⁹. Thus, the question of the direct source of Moneta's inspiration retains its relevance⁸⁰. Specifically, in agreement with William and Hugh, Moneta recaps *ad litteram* Aristotle's argument about opposite beginnings *contrar-*

⁷⁴ Balliol College 62, fol. 103vb–104va.

⁷⁵ G.G. Stroumsa (1992) 181. The researcher incorrectly added to the list of those interfacing eternity, heretics, and Aristotle Roland of Cremona. The master clearly and for the first time distinguished Aristotle's argument about circular eternal motion and various heretical sects he reports to converse in person, including an interrogation on the plurality of the worlds (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 729, fol. 30rb–31ra).

⁷⁶ P. Biller (1999) 31–32.

⁷⁷ Vat. lat. 729, fol. 30vb–31ra.

⁷⁸ Ibid, fol. 31ra.

⁷⁹ Ibid., fol. 30va.

⁸⁰ Even though by taking vows as a Dominican in 1219 ever-popular Roland galvanized Moneta's religious life (N. Gorochov (2012) 372), their intellectual aspirations proceeded in different directions.

iorum contraria sunt principia and peripatetic duality, i.e. *operator* acting on existing matter⁸¹. Hereafter, he follows their heels by rehearsing an opposition of the evil and good God, *quia Deus bonus est* attributed to unknown philosophers, divine eternal outflow *ab aeterno influit*, and three eternal instances in God *potentia, sapientia, voluntas* required for the Artisan *Artifex* to turn into action⁸². The Italian inquisitor struggles to copy interwoven handling of Aristotle and Manichean deprecating those who strive to redeem the philosopher *quidam nitantur Aristotelem excusare* and assume the perpetuity of the world *mundus totalis perpetuus*, a clear-cut feature of Alexander of Hales and Philip the Chancellor⁸³. Fortified by the Christian dogma, Hugh's isomorphism confronts such views merging Cathar's theology and Aristotle's metaphysics, though to my surprise the present investigation corroborates J.-P. Torrell's discovery that reasons borrowed by Hugh from mature masters had a way more effect than his original contribution⁸⁴.

Shifting the timeline, I will present Peter Aureol's testimony extracted from the long *Sentences* commentary (ca. 1320), a paragon of scholastic intellection, in order to better apprehend the *topos* of issues elucidated by Hugh. While the axis of dualistic heresy completely disappears from the first distinction, *Doctor Facundus* still reserves the prologue and first question for the discussion of Aristotle, Averroes, and eternity. Notwithstanding, he demonstrates through cutting the Gordian knot that all *a priori* arguments including divine freedom of choice promoted by Duns Scotus, the succession of present moments, and the difference between God and the world do not contradict *non repugnat* eternity⁸⁵. Conversely, he proposes that if one took into account the possibility of eternity, it would require grappling with *a posteriori* paradoxes like the inextinguishable nascence of human beings, endless actual division, the unending duration of creatures, and the absence of measure⁸⁶. Peter Aureol's analysis yields valuable insight into the evolution of scholastic thought enshrining certain of William, Alexander, and Hugh's ideas even in the form of rejected anonymous *a priori* arguments at the same part of the *Sentences*. Onwards, medieval history might puzzle out why Hugh of Saint-Cher's chiasm did not endure in the long run, as became apparent in Thomas' *Sentences*. By the beginning of the 14th century, the Cathars had been razed to the ground, leaving no one to stand up for them in the throes of theological debates. Though, in a larger sense the vogue for lingering issues that surround eternity and the double truth

⁸¹ Moneta Cremonensis (1743) 23, 483.

⁸² Ibid. 25, 487.

⁸³ Ibid. 487.

⁸⁴ J.-P. Torrell (1974) 270.

⁸⁵ Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 942, fols. 2r–4v.

⁸⁶ Ibid. fol. 5rb.

doctrine⁸⁷ continued to blossom and proliferate with novel university generations throughout the Late Middle Ages.

Editio Hugonis

The second book of Hugh of Saint-Cher's *Sentences* has received undeservedly the least attention among the four books. Hugh's distinction II.1 has been known exclusively through its incipit prepared by M. Bieniak⁸⁸. The present edition based on the collation of six manuscripts, all available to me, contains the first part of the second book, whereas the distinction goes on. However, I have decided not to include the rest since there Hugh above all focuses on illuminating Peter Lombard's text in the form of traditional literal exposition rather than amplifying independent issues. The part I have included provides a coherent and insightful elaboration without extensive hermeneutics.

I avail the following sigla to designate the manuscripts: Vat. lat. 1098 = *V*, BNF lat. 3073 = *P*, Brugge 178 = *B*, Assisi 130 = *A*, Assisi 131 = *A*₂, BNF lat. 10728 = *P*₂. *VPAA*₂ account for a family of *peciae* (a number of authorized copies replicate one codex for future partial borrowing by students) sharing a common *exemplar* from the Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig (MS 573) and bearing tenets of students' loan. This includes *notae* and *auctoritates* written in the margins not to mention opinions of other masters, in particular Gueric of Saint-Quentin. *A*₂ was widely accommodated by the Franciscans and Federico Visconti. *B* is also a *pecia* assumedly deriving from another *exemplar* which enfolds different readings and a complete version of the *Quaestio de dotibus resurgentium* abridged in *VPAA*₂. *P*₂ stands out as a separate textual tradition since it comprises exclusively the second books preceded by tractates on moral theology⁸⁹. Manuscript *V* has been chosen as the basic codex for its readability and clarity. All reading variants are given in the *apparatus criticus* accompanied by the *apparatus fontium* where I have put references to the

⁸⁷ That is a conservative and posterior misrepresentation of Philip's approach to Aristotle, according to R. Dales (R.C. Dales (1989) 64).

⁸⁸ M. Bieniak (2013) 56–57. Almost a century ago F. Ehrle prepared an inexact transcription of the incipit II.1 in order to support his patchy accusation of anti-Aristotelism brought against Hugh and ratified by F. van Steenberghen instead of looking what was original in the first Dominican's reasoning on Aristotle (F. Ehrle (1925) 544; F. van Steenberghen (1966) 158): though, without Hugh of Saint-Cher, Gueric of Saint-Quentin, or Odo Rigaud's moderate treatment of Aristotle in a critical light, neither Albert nor Bonaventure and Thomas would have appeared in the shape we know and praise them (on the discrepancy how to betake Aristotle at Paris in that era see S.E. Young (2014) 97–98).

⁸⁹ J.G. Bougerol (1983) 13; B. Faes de Mottoni (2004) 275, 278, 285; N. Bériou (2004) 262–263.

Latin sources. In the translation, I have checked out existing English versions of Hugh of Saint-Cher's references; I have also attempted to use the closest English terms possible to render Latin theological and philosophical notions without altering the technical and formal style of the scholastic distinction.

I have synchronized the grammar, punctuation, and paragraph division of the transcription with modern standards. The medieval spelling has been preserved, all quotations and references are italicized. To make the text more accessible, I have split up the polemics against Aristotle and Manichean into small paragraphs⁹⁰ where Roman numerals signify Hugh's arguments. Proper names begin with capital letters except for *nomina sacra*. () denotes editorial notes, || stays for the start of a new column, < > indicates editor's supplements to the Latin text. Now, I hope you will allow Hugh of Saint-Cher to speak for himself and claim your interest.

⁹⁰ By the same token, the scribe P_2 made efforts to assign key points by means of marginal glosses.

HUGO DE SANCTO CARO

OPUS. LIBER II. DISTINCTIO I. PARS PRIMA⁹¹

Incipit secundus liber.

1. Creationem rerum etc. Postquam magister egit de creatore, agit de creaturis hoc ordine. Primo auctoritate scripture probat unum esse principium omnium contra quosdam philosophos, qui ponunt plura principia rerum. Secundo ostendit causam creatoris rerum, ubi dicit⁹² *et quia non ualet*⁹³ et cetera | 45vb |. Tercio quod rerum quedam est spiritualis, ut angelus, quedam corporalis, ut elementa et similia, quorumdam partim spiritualis, partim corporalis, ut homo. Primo inter hec agit de spirituali, id est de angelis. Quarto expedit se de creatione rerum corporalium⁹⁴. Quinto et ultimo de homine plura dicturus diffusius exequitur⁹⁵.

2. Probans ergo unum auctoritate scripture,⁹⁶ ait unum esse omne principium, per quod multorum elidit errores. Aristoteles dixit⁹⁷ mundum esse eternum, cuius error eliditur, ubi dicitur *in principio*⁹⁸. Plato dixit tria esse principia, scilicet deum, ydeas et puram materiam, scilicet ylem⁹⁹, cuius error eliditur, ubi dicit *creauit*. Creare enim est de nichilo aliquid facere et ita non de materia¹⁰⁰. Epicurus¹⁰¹ ponit¹⁰² infinita esse principia, cuius error similiter eliditur, cum dicit *creauit*¹⁰³. Manicheus¹⁰⁴ dixit duo esse principia: unum bonorum, quod uocauit¹⁰⁵ bonum deum siue deum lucis, siue deum Noui Testamenti¹⁰⁶, et hunc dicebat¹⁰⁷ tantum esse¹⁰⁸ principium spiritualium rerum; alterum malorum, quem uocauit deum

⁹¹ V: 45va–46rb; P: 31ra–31vb; B: 38rb–38vb; A: 41ra–41va; A₂: 41ra–41va; P₂: 98ra–98vb

⁹² dicit] *add.* distinctio P₂

⁹³ Petrus Lombardus (1971) 332.

⁹⁴ corporalium] spiritualium P₁

⁹⁵ exequitur] exequit A,

⁹⁶ <Moyses>

⁹⁷ Aristoteles (1990) VIII.6; cf. Vat. lat. 2435, fol. 122r.

⁹⁸ Gen. 1:1.

⁹⁹ ylem] ylen VA, yle BP₂

¹⁰⁰ de materia] demencia V

¹⁰¹ Epicurus] Epycurus V

¹⁰² Cf. M. J. Clark (2005) 128.

¹⁰³ Gen. 1:1.

¹⁰⁴ Manicheus] *marg.* Opinio Manichei P₁

¹⁰⁵ uocauit] prouocauit A₂

¹⁰⁶ Noui Testamenti] nature V Ueteris Testamenti P₁A₁A₂P₂

¹⁰⁷ dicebat] dicebant VP₁BA₁

¹⁰⁸ esse] *om.* VA,

malum siue deum tenebrarum, siue deum Ueteris Testamenti, hunc dicebant tantum esse principium rerum corporalium¹⁰⁹ ¹¹⁰.

3. Aristoteles¹¹¹ et qui, cum eo ponunt mundum eternum, decepti fuerunt, quia rationes naturales adoptabant deo, sicut patet in secundo De Generatione et Corruptione, ubi supponitur¹¹² hec propositio tanquam per se nota: *Idem*¹¹³ *similiter omnino se habens, natum*¹¹⁴ *est omnino idem facere*¹¹⁵. Sed prima causa omnino similiter semper se¹¹⁶ habet, immutabilis enim est¹¹⁷. Ergo si aliquando fuit principium mundi et semper fuit principium mundi¹¹⁸, ergo ab eterno fuit principium mundi¹¹⁹.

4. Item ad hoc, ut artifex exeat in actum, susficiunt tria¹²⁰, scilicet potencia, sciencia, uoluntas. Sed hoc ab eterno fuerat in deo, ergo deus ab eterno potuit facere mundum et sciuit, et uoluit¹²¹, ergo ab eterno fecit illum¹²².

5. Item uidetur per Augustinum probari. Dicit enim et uerum est, quod *deus quia bonus est, sumus*¹²³. Sed ab eterno bonus est¹²⁴, ergo ab eterno sumus.

¹⁰⁹ corporalium] *margin.* opinio Aristotelis, opinio Platonis, opinio Epicuri, opinio Manichei P_2

¹¹⁰ Cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1.

¹¹¹ Aristoteles] *margin.* prima probacio, quod mundus est eternum per Aristotelem A_2

¹¹² supponitur] supponit A_2

¹¹³ Idem] Item A ,

¹¹⁴ *natum*] *notum* A_2

¹¹⁵ Aristoteles (1997) II.10.

¹¹⁶ se] *margin.* sicut dicit Ioannes Damascenus in libro primo, capitulo VIII: *et semper similiter habens* A_2

¹¹⁷ Cf. Alexander de Hales (1952) I.13.c.

¹¹⁸ mundi, ergo] *add.* sed modo est principium V sed modo est principium mundi $P_1A_1A_2P_2$

¹¹⁹ ergo ... mundi] *om.* A ,

¹²⁰ Cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) App. I.1

¹²¹ Cf. Vat. lat. 7669, fol. 7rb.

¹²² Cf. Alexander de Hales (1957) I.13.

¹²³ Aurelius Augustinus (1995) 32.35; cf. Petrus Lombardus (1971) 332; Alexander de Hales (1952) I.23.

¹²⁴ est] *om.* V

6. Item¹²⁵ summe bonitatis est semper effluere¹²⁶. Sed ab eterno fuit summa bonitas, ergo ab eterno fluxit. Sed eius effluxio nichil¹²⁷ aliud est quam mundi et eorum, que in mundo sunt¹²⁸, creatio.

7. Ergo creatio¹²⁹ mundi ab eterno est, quod non potest esse. Cum enim mundus creatura sit, de necessitate habet principium¹³⁰ et ita¹³¹ ab eterno non est, quod concedimus.

8. Dicimus ergo ad primum, quod propositio Aristotelis tantum tenet in naturalis, ubi est tantum naturalis ordo principii et principiati et non uoluntarius.

9. Ad secundum dicimus, quod causa uoluntaria dilatoria est. Preelegit enim, quod et quando res¹³² faciat¹³³, unde non sequitur in creaturis: uult hoc facere, ergo facit. Concedimus ergo, quod deus ab eterno uoluit mundum facere. Non tamen uoluit illum facere ab eterno, sed tunc¹³⁴, quando fecit, unde est ibi fallacia compositionis et diuisionis¹³⁵.

10. Ad ultimum dicimus, quod summe bonitatis triplex est effluxio¹³⁶, scilicet per generationem, per spirationem, per creationem. Due prime sunt naturales, tertia uoluntaria. Due prime fuerunt¹³⁷ ab eterno et in¹³⁸ illis maxime apparet summa bonitas et summa perfectio. Tercia cepit esse cum tempore nec in illo apparuit summe bonitatis immensitas. Totus enim | 46ra | mundus est quasi quedam parua stilla bonitatis dei et mirabilius est¹³⁹, quomodo¹⁴⁰ potuit tam paruuum facere, quam quod de nichilo fecit.

¹²⁵ Item] *add.* per *VP, A, A₂*

¹²⁶ Cf. Dionysiaca (1937) De diuinis nominibus 4:16; Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) App. I.3; Alexander de Hales (1952) I.13.g.

¹²⁷ nichil] *ul A₁*

¹²⁸ sunt] *fuit P₂*

¹²⁹ creatio] *del. V*

¹³⁰ principium] *initium P, BA, P₂*

¹³¹ ita] *om. V*

¹³² quod ... res] *quomodo ... et rem V quomodo ... rem P₂*

¹³³ Cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) App. I, sol. 1.

¹³⁴ tunc] *om. B*

¹³⁵ Aristoteles (1975) 15.

¹³⁶ triplex est effluxio] *marg.* triplex est effluxio *A₂*

¹³⁷ fuerunt] *fuere A, A₂*

¹³⁸ in] *om. VP, A, A₂, P₂*

¹³⁹ est] *om. V*

¹⁴⁰ quomodo] *quando A₂*

11. Quod autem Plato et Epicurus ponunt eternam materiam, de qua deus, cum uellet, posset operari, decepti fuerunt, suspicantes ad modum hominis deum non posse de nichilo¹⁴¹ operari, quod si esset, omnipotens non esset.

12. Manicheus¹⁴² autem hiis abutitur rationibus ad probandum errorem suum.

13. Cuius causa est inuariabilis, ipsum est inuariabilis¹⁴³. Sed bonus¹⁴⁴ est inuariabilis, ergo non est causa uariabilium siue uisibilium.

14. Item nichil est causa constructiua et destructiua eiusdem¹⁴⁵. Sed bonus deus est causa constructiua malorum hominum, ergo non est causa destructiua eorumdem.

15. Item contrariorum contraria sunt principia¹⁴⁶. Sed bonus deus est principium bonorum, ergo non est principium malorum et aliquid est principium malorum. Ergo deus malus, qui est summe malus et ideo principium malorum, sicut deus bonus est summe bonus et ideo principium bonorum.

16. Sed ad hoc debet dici¹⁴⁷, quod prima propositio Manichei non ualet, nisi in causis coniunctis suis effectibus. Immo necesse est, quod omne uariabile sit ab inuariabili, sicut motus ab immobili et multitudo¹⁴⁸ ab unitate.

17. Secunda propositio est falsa in uoluntariis, ut patet in fabro, qui sepe destruit, quod fecerat.

18. Tercia simpliciter falsa est, ut patet in primis contrariis¹⁴⁹, que fuerunt ab eodem. Aliter processus esset in¹⁵⁰ infinitum aut tot essent principia, quot sunt contraria, quod etiam contra ipsos est, qui non ponunt, nisi duo¹⁵¹ principia, scilicet unum bonorum summe bonum et aliud malorum summe malum.

¹⁴¹ nichilo] nullo *A*,

¹⁴² Manicheus] *marg.* probacio, quod duo sunt principia secundum Manicheum *A*₂

¹⁴³ Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) I.3.

¹⁴⁴ bonus] *add.* a deus *B*

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1.

¹⁴⁶ Aristoteles (1997) IX.1; Saint-Omer 595, fol. 30r; cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982)

VIII.1.

¹⁴⁷ dici] *marg.* responsio *A*₂

¹⁴⁸ multitudo] *marg.* unde dicit Philosophus in principio Physice *A*₂

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1.

¹⁵⁰ in] *om.* *V*

¹⁵¹ duo] duos *V*

19. ¹⁵²Esse creatorem, per hoc, quod dicit *creauit*, initium, per hoc, quod dicit *in principio*, uisibilium, per *terram* autem; inuisibilium¹⁵³¹⁵⁴, per *celum*. ¹⁵⁵In uno principio, id est in initio temporis uel in filio¹⁵⁶, esse factum¹⁵⁷, id est creatum, ¹⁵⁸sine principio, id est initio.

20. Quod autem sit unum principium tantum omnium rerum, probatur sic¹⁵⁹.

21. Quod per superhabundaciam dicitur uni soli conuenit, ergo unicum est summe bonum, ergo unicum est principium rerum.

22. Preterea, si essent plura¹⁶⁰ summe bona, ergo essent diffirencia, ergo aliquid haberet unum, quod non reliquum. Sed summe bonum non habet in se nisi bonum, ergo aliquid bonum haberet unum, quod non reliquum, ergo illud non esset summe bonum, cum alio bono careret.

23. Sed notandum, quod cum dicitur *in principio creauit deus celum et cetera*¹⁶¹, Manichei dicunt, quod Moyses loquitur de deo malo¹⁶², qui fecit omnia uisibilia secundum eos.

24. Sed ipsi bene concedunt, quod deus bonus est summe bonum et tale, quo¹⁶³ melius excogitari non potest¹⁶⁴.

25. Sed secundum eos sunt plura principia: unum bonorum, aliud malorum, quia duo contraria non possunt habere unum principium, ut dicunt.

26. Sed contra eos sic obicitur.

27. Posse¹⁶⁵ cohibere malum est bonum¹⁶⁶, hec propositio per se nota est. Sed deus bonus aut habet illud bonum, aut non. Si non, ergo aliquo¹⁶⁷ bono caret, ergo non est summe bonum nec tale, quo melius excogitari non potest.

¹⁵² <Scriptura ostendit deum>

¹⁵³ inuisibilium] *add. per inuisibilium V*

¹⁵⁴ <creaturarum>

¹⁵⁵ <Moyses refert>

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Alexander de Hales (1952) I.3.

¹⁵⁷ <mundum a deo>

¹⁵⁸ <elidens errorem quorundam opinantium plura principia fuisse>

¹⁵⁹ sic] *marg. probacio, quod unum est principium omnium rerum tamen A₂ marg. probatur esse unum ibidem principium P₂*

¹⁶⁰ plura] pulcra A,

¹⁶¹ Gen. 1:1.

¹⁶² de deo malo] *om. A,*

¹⁶³ quo] quod A,

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Vat. lat. 7669, fol. 6ra; Alexander de Hales (1952) I.6.a.

¹⁶⁵ Posse] Posse ~~sunt~~ V

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis (1982) VIII.1; Alexander de Hales (1952) I.6.b.

¹⁶⁷ aliquo] aliquid V

28. Item posse cohibere malum¹⁶⁸ est posse bonum. Sed deus bonus non potest illud, ergo non est omnipotens. Si dicas, quod deus bonus potest cohibere malum, ergo potest cohibere deum ma | 46rb | lum, ne faciat malum. Ergo deus malus ex se et per se non potest operari malum, quia¹⁶⁹, si ex se et per se haberet illam potenciam, non posset impediri, sicut deus bonus non potest impediri ab operatione boni, ergo non est summe malus.

29. Tria¹⁷⁰, id est principia sine initio: exemplar, id est ydeas; materiam, id est yle¹⁷³; quasi¹⁷⁴ artificem, qui operatur ex preiacenti materia; uocaturque¹⁷⁶ factor¹⁷⁷, homo uel angelus. Et creare sicut facere, cum dicitur *deus facit hanc rem*, hoc uerbum *facit* predicat diuinam essenciam, ut causam, et connotat¹⁷⁹ in creatura habitudinem creature ad factorem siue creatorem, scilicet habitudinem¹⁸⁰ effectus ad causam, que uoluntarie operator. Sed dictum de creatura significat actionem, que est accidentalitas proprietatis, hoc uerbum *creat* pretar hoc remouet materiam. Uerumtamen¹⁸¹ et cetera¹⁸², idem est deo esse et¹⁸³ uelle, creare et¹⁸⁴ facere¹⁸⁵, sed deus est ab eterno et uult ab eterno, ergo facit et creat ab eterno¹⁸⁶.

30. Solutio¹⁸⁷, quo ad principale significatum idem sunt. Sed creat et facit connotant aliquid¹⁸⁸ creatum et temporale ratione, cuius non sunt idem, unde cum

¹⁶⁸ malum] malum ergo potest cohibere V

¹⁶⁹ non potest ... malum, quia] haberet illam potenciam, non potest impediri, non potest operari malum, quia B

¹⁷⁰ <Plato namque>

¹⁷¹ Tria] add. inicia P₂

¹⁷² <initia existimauit>

¹⁷³ yle] ylen V

¹⁷⁴ <et deum>

¹⁷⁵ <not creatorem, sed>

¹⁷⁶ Uocaturque] Notaturque V

¹⁷⁷ <sed non creator>

¹⁷⁸ <In scriptura sepe creator accipitur tanquam factor>

¹⁷⁹ connotat] conuocat P₂

¹⁸⁰ scilicet habitudinem] add. scilicet habitudinem B

¹⁸¹ <agere, creare, facere>

¹⁸² <non dicuntur de deo et creaturis eodem modo>

¹⁸³ et] om. V

¹⁸⁴ et] om. V

¹⁸⁵ Cf. A.M. Landgraf (1952) 69.

¹⁸⁶ eterno] marg. questio, si deus ab eterno, quod uult ab eterno et creat A₂

¹⁸⁷ Solutio] marg. Solutio A₂

¹⁸⁸ aliquid] quid V

dicitur *deus creat*, hoc¹⁸⁹ est sensus: deus est, ex cuius uoluntate hoc consistit, quid enim est aliud, ut ait Augustinus: *deo auctore factum est, nisi deo¹⁹⁰ uolente, nec tamen uelle est facere¹⁹¹*. Licet figuratiue dicatur ob hoc, scilicet quia uoluntatem eius necessario sequitur effectus, sicut misericordia dei et iusticia idem sunt, non tamen idem est punire et parcere, agitatione,¹⁹² id est <non> mouit¹⁹³.

31. Operatorium, id est dictum, qui operatur. Ex hiis Aristoteles¹⁹⁴ appellat principia, que sunt de re, ut materia et forma, que duo pro uno principio reputat, quod non sequitur; et tertium *operatorium* dictum non est intelligendum tertium principium, quia sic non consonat littera. Sed tertium a predictis duobus, que sumit pro uno principio et illud tertium pro secundo principio, et sic ponit duo esse principia. Et potest hoc dictio *dictum* uel adiectiue accipi, uel substantiue addicendo quasi dictione *operatorium*: dixit enim et facta sunt.

32. Tradens, per Moysen¹⁹⁶, et ante tempora significat¹⁹⁷, quando¹⁹⁸ enim tempora crearet, si prius non esset¹⁹⁹, exstitisse,²⁰⁰ scilicet deum.

¹⁸⁹ hoc] hic *V*

¹⁹⁰ deo] deo auctore factum est *V*

¹⁹¹ Aurelius Augustinus (1970) lib. I, q. 3.

¹⁹² <eius uoluntate res noue esse incipiunt, absque ipsius>

¹⁹³ mouit] monit *BA*

¹⁹⁴ Aristoteles (1997) II.51–52.

¹⁹⁵ <Horum errorem spiritus sanctus euacuans, ueritatisque disciplinam>

¹⁹⁶ Moysen] Moysen *VA*₂

¹⁹⁷ significat] sunt *V*

¹⁹⁸ quando] quomodo *VP*₂

¹⁹⁹ esset] essent *B*

²⁰⁰ <eternaliter>

HUGH OF SAINT-CHER

THE WORK. BOOK II. DISTINCTION I. THE FIRST PART

The second book begins.

1. Creation of things etc. After discussing the creator of things and other subjects the master considers creatures in the following order: first, he proves with the authority of the Holy Scripture that the beginning (principium) of everything is one against those philosophers who consider multiple beginnings of things; second, he demonstrates the cause behind the creator of things where it is said *and it is not valid*; third, he claims that some things are spiritual like an angel, others are corporal as elements and similar, some happen to be partially spiritual and partially corporal like a human being. Above all, he refers to the spiritual, namely angels. Fourth, he explores the creation of corporeal things. Fifth and last, intending to speculate more about man he widely accomplishes this subject.

2. Proving the divine oneness by authority of the Holy Scripture, <Moses> asserts that the beginning of everything is one wherewith he eliminates the errors of many people. Aristotle claimed that the world exists eternally whose error is refuted as it is said *in the beginning (in principio)*. Plato proclaimed there are three beginnings, namely God, ideas, and pure matter or hyle whose fallacy is obviated since it is said *created*. Indeed, to create (creare) designates to make (facere) something from nothing and thus not from matter. Epicurus supposes an infinite number of beginnings whose fault is identically excluded when it is said *created*. Manichaeans claimed two beginnings exist: one of good which he calls a good God, God of light, or God of the New Testament; he also stated that he accounts exclusively for the beginning of spiritual. Another of evil which he calls an evil God, God of shades, or God of the Old Testament; they also asserted that he solely stands for the beginning of corporal.

3. Aristotle and those who proclaimed under his influence that the world is eternal were deceived because they employed natural explanations to God as follows from the second book "On the Generation and Corruption" where this proposition is assumed to be self-evident: *So, everything which has a likeness to itself is inborn to produce everything similar*. However, the first cause has always everything akin to it for it remains unalterable. Therefore, if ever the beginning of the world was, it has always been the origin of the world. It follows that the origin of the world existed from eternity.

4. Onwards, an artisan needs three things to proceed into action: power, knowledge, and will. Though, this was in God eternally. Hence God was able to

create the world, he knew and desired that from eternity, so he created it from eternity.

5. Further, it seems possible to prove this through Augustine. He truly says: *we exist because God is good*. Yet he is good in eternity, then we exist eternally.

6. Likewise, the highest good always outflows (*effluere*). But the highest good existed eternally, so it emanates from eternity; still, its emanation is nothing more than the creation of the world and things in the world.

7. As a result, the creation of the world originates from eternity which could not be possible. So far as the world is a creature stemming from necessity, it has a beginning and does not exist eternally what we approve.

8. For we say to the first argument that Aristotle's statement stretches out only to natural things where there is merely a natural order of the beginning and of what begins with it and does not reach voluntary things.

9. To the second we say that a voluntary cause presumes a delayed effect. It chooses what things to make and when that does not apply to creatures: one wants to make this, so he makes. We consent, therefore, that God wanted to make the world eternally. Yet, he wanted to make the world at the moment when he created and not from eternity, whence the fallacy of composition and division is present there.

10. To the last we respond that the highest good constitutes a triple outflow through generation, spiration, and creation; the first two are natural, while the third is voluntary. The first two were from eternity: the highest good and the highest perfection appear as well in these two. The third comes into existence in time and the highest good did not manifest itself in it. For the whole world is like a small drop of the divine goodness and that is even more wonderful how he could make as little as what he created out of nothing.

11. Since Plato and Epicurus suppose eternal matter upon which God could act (*operari*) whenever he wants. Suspecting that as a man God could not act out of nothing they were deceived for if he were such, he would not be omnipotent.

12. Manichean also abuses the following arguments to prove his own mistake:

13. Those things which have an immutable cause are themselves immutable. Notwithstanding, the good is immutable, so it is not the cause of mutable or visible things.

14. Likewise, there is no constructive and destructive cause behind the same. However, the good God is the constructive cause of evil things, consequently, he is not the destructive cause of them.

15. Similarly, opposites are the beginnings of opposites. Though, the good God is the beginning of good, thence he is not the beginning of evil and something else is the beginning of evil. Thus, it is the evil God who is the highest evilness and for

that reason the beginning of evil as the good God is the highest good and for that reason the beginning of good.

16. Nevertheless, to this it should be stated that Manichean's first argument holds no weight except in causes linked with their effects. On the contrary, all mutable must originate from immutable like motion from immobile and multitude from unity.

17. The second proposition is false in voluntary subjects as it appears in the case of an artisan who often destroys what he made before.

18. The third is openly erroneous as it is clear from the first opposites which arise from the same. Otherwise, either the process would go on infinitely or there would be as many beginnings as opposites which actually contradicts those who assume only two beginnings, namely one of good, the highest good, and another of evil, the highest evil.

19. <The Holy Scripture demonstrates that God> is the creator, by saying *he created*, and beginning of time, by saying *in the beginning*, the creator of visible is denoted by *earth*, and invisible creatures by *heaven*. Moses says that in one beginning, viz. at the commencement of time or in the Son, the world was made, that is created, <refuting the error of some people who argue there were multiple beginnings> without a beginning, that is without a commencement.

20. What only one beginning of all exists is demonstrated in the following way:

21. It is asserted by overabundance that it would be appropriate for only one to exist, therefore the highest good is singular, hence the beginning of things is singular.

22. Additionally, if many highest goods existed, they would become different, accordingly one beginning would have a certain good which another beginning would not possess. Though, the highest good does not have in itself anything besides good, consequently, something good would have one good that another good would not have, thus, this one good would not be the highest good if it lacked another good.

23. However, the following should be noted: the Manicheans affirm that when it is stated *In the beginning God created heaven <and earth>* Moses speaks about the evil God who created all visible, according to them.

24. Though, they themselves rightly approve that the good God is the highest good and better than which nothing greater can be conceived.

25. Nevertheless, according to them, there are multiple beginnings: one of good, another of evil because two opposites could not have one common beginning, as they assert.

26. But the following is held against them:

27. The proposition *to be able to restrain evil is good* is self-evident. Yet, the good God either has this good or does not. If not, then he lacks some good. Therefore, he is not the highest good and better than which nothing greater can be conceived.

28. Further, to be able to restrain evil is to be able to be good. Notwithstanding, the good God cannot achieve this and whence is not omnipotent. If you claim that the good God can restrain evil, then he can restrain the evil God so that he does not evil. Thus, the evil God out of himself and by himself cannot do evil for if he out of himself and by himself had such potency, it would be impossible to hinder his misdoings, like nothing could hinder the good God from doing good, hence he is not the highest evil.

29. And indeed, Plato supposed three beginnings without commencement: example, namely ideas; matter, that is hyle; and God as he were not the creator but the artesian who works from adjacent matter; and a human or an angel is called the maker (factor), not the creator. <In the Holy Scripture the creator is often taken for maker> and create for make, when it is said that God makes (facit) this thing, the word makes predicates divine essence as a cause and implies in the creature a relation of the creature with the maker or creator, i.e. the relation of effect to cause which acts voluntarily. However, this statement about creature denotes an action that accounts for an accidental property; besides, the word creates implies an exclusion of matter. Nevertheless, to act, to create, to make and so forth are not said of God and creatures in the same way for God to exist and to will, to create and to make are the same but God exists and wills from eternity, thus makes and creates eternally.

30. The solution: among these predicates the main sense is the same. Notwithstanding, to create connotes something created and to make signifies what is defined in time. They are not identical since when *God creates* is asserted, the sense is the following: it is God from whose will something else comes into existence. Likewise, Augustine writes: *it was made by the divine authority, if not by the divine will, and yet to will does not mean to make*. Albeit, this could be stated figuratively, that is the effect necessarily follows from the divine will as God's mercy and justice are the same but to punish and to pity do not signify equal things, <by his will new thing come into existence without him being> moved, he <did not> move.

31. The operating is called (dictum) one who operates. Aristotle names such beginnings which are real as matter and form, reflecting two beginnings as one that is not consistent, and the third called *operating* which should not be understood as the third beginning since the text does not say so. However, interpreted in the following way there are two beginnings: the third from the aforesaid two <matter and form> which he takes for one beginning and this third taken for the second beginning. And this expression *called* could be accepted either as an adjective

(called) or as a noun (word) by adding an *operating* word: for he said (dixit) and things were made.

32. <The Saint Spirit annulling their error and> delivering <the knowledge of the truth> through Moses, and before the time signifies, for when he would create time if he did not precede it, that means he God existed eternally.

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