

Seminar Chrysippus' *On Affections* – Teun Tieleman

A. TRANSLATION OF THE RELEVANT TESTIMONIES AND NON-CICERONIAN FRAGMENTS

Testimonia:

1. Galen, *Loc. Aff.* III, 1: VIII p. 138 K. (*SVF* 3.457):

... theoretical are all those [studies] which going beyond practical utility consider the nature of things, of whatever kind they are with respect to their own essence: thus, for instance, Chrysippus the philosopher, too, wrote on the affections of the soul one book *Therapeutics*, which we use above all with a view to their cure, and three others containing theoretical (λογικὸς) inquiries.

2. Galen, *PHP*, 4.1.14, p.238.4-6 De Lacy (*SVF* 3.461):

..... his entire treatise *On Affections*, the three books in which he investigates theoretical questions about them and moreover the *Therapeutics*, which is also entitled *Ethics* by some ...

3. Cicero, *TD* 4.9 (*SVF* 3.483):

When Chrysippus and the Stoics discuss the soul's affections, they are in large part engaged in dividing and defining them; quite brief is that exposition of theirs on how they cure the souls and do not permit them [i.e. the souls] to be disturbed.

Fragments:

BOOK ONE

1.(a) Gal. *PHP* 4.2.4-7:

(4) ... In these definitions however he supposes that the affections are conations and opinions and judgements; but in some of the very next definitions he writes things that are consistent with the doctrines of Epicurus and Zeno rather than his own. (5) For in defining distress he says it is a shrinking before what is thought to be a thing to avoid and pleasure he defines as a swelling at what is thought to be a thing to choose. (6) But the shrinkings and swellings and contractions and expansions—for these too he mentions sometimes—are affections (*παθήματα*) of the irrational power which supervene on the opinions. Epicurus and Zeno hold that the affections have such a nature as this but Chrysippus does not. (7) And it strikes me as astounding that the man who professes to be giving both logical and precise instruction is not precise.

(b) Gal. *PHP* 4.2.10-12 (p.240, ll.18-29, *SVF* 3.462):

(10) First it should be kept in mind that the rational animal is by nature something that follows reason and acts in accordance with reason as its guide. (11) Often, however, he moves differently towards certain things and away from certain things in disobedience to reason when he is pushed too much. To this movement both definitions refer, because the unnatural motion arises irrationally in this way and so does the excess in our conations. (12) For the word ‘irrational’ should be taken as disobedient to reason and having turned away from reason, in accordance with which movement we say in ordinary usage that certain persons ‘are pushed’ and ‘moved irrationally’, ‘without reason and judgement’. For when we use these expressions it is not as if a person is carried away by error and having overlooked something according to reason, but especially with reference to the motion which he [scil. Zeno] outlines, since it is not the nature of a rational animal to move thus in his soul but in accordance with reason.

2. Gal. *PHP*, 4.2.14-18 (*SVF*3.462):

(14) The excess of conation has also been meant¹ in this sense, on account of exceeding the measure of themselves and nature. (15) What is meant could become clearer by these things, for instance in the case of walking in accordance with conation the motion of the legs is not excessive but somehow commensurate with the conation, so that one may also stop when one wishes, and change one's pace. (16) But in the case of persons running in accordance with conation this sort of thing no longer happens but the movement of the legs exceeds the conation, and they do not obediently change their pace as soon as they have started. (17) Something similar to these [scil. movements of the legs] happens, I think, also in the case of the conations because of an excess of the measure of reason, so that when (a person) exercises conation he is not obedient to it [scil. reason], if in the case of running the excess meant goes beyond conation and in the case of conation beyond reason. (18) After all, natural conation is measured in terms of reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right. Thus when excess arises in this respect and in this manner, it is said to be an excessive and an unnatural and irrational movement of the soul.

3. Gal. *PHP* 4.5.5-7 (*SVF* 3.476):

... (5) On occasion he [scil. Chrysippus] also falls into the assertion that the movements related to the affections occur 'at random', which is not by no means different from 'uncaused', if one weighs the word exactly.² (6) Thus directly after the passages I quoted a little earlier,³ he says: "Fluttering" too has been appropriately used to describe the affections as a class in respect of this "being agitated"⁴ and "moving at random" '. (7)

¹ Scil. by Zeno.

² Cf. Pl. *Theae*. 184c.

³ Cf. *ibid.* 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (pp. 256-8 De Lacy).

⁴ For the passive voice of the rare composite ἐνσοβέω *LSJ* only gives this occurrence in the meaning 'agitation' (no doubt in view of the article τὸ), but it is more likely that it indicates that it is used to refer to the expression as used in the context preceding the quotation, which is how De Lacy apparently takes it, putting τὸ ἐνσοβηζόμενον τοῦτο and εἰκῆ φερόμενον between inverted commas. This suggests that these terms too had been used by Zeno or, more likely, had been adduced by Chrysippus himself as items of common parlance supporting Zeno's definition of affection as a fluttering of the soul. De Lacy's translation 'being ruffled' seems less apposite. The meaning of ἐνσοβέω seems identical to that of the simple verb σοβέω, whose primary meaning is 'causing a violent movement', i.e. 'drive away' or 'scare away'. The focus on movement again. The passive voice also bears the metaphorical sense 'to be excited' or 'to be agitated' and is used in connection with various forceful affections. See *LSJ* s.v. σοβέω II.

But if by ‘random’ you mean ‘uncaused’, Chrysippus, you are in conflict both with yourself and with Aristotle and Plato and the notions of all men and long before that you are in conflict with the very nature of things given the fact that nothing can happen without a cause ..

4. Gal. *PHP* 5.3.12 (not in *SVF*):

Chrysippus in the first book *On Affections* confused the notion of disease by saying that disease in the soul is analogous to the state of the body, in which it is prone to fevers or diarrhoea or something of the kind.

BOOK TWO

5. Gal. *PHP* 4.7.1-11 (1-7 ~ *SVF* 3.481, Posid. F 165 E.-K.):

(1) ... I proceed to some of Posidonius’ answers to Chrysippus: (2) This definition of distress,⁵ he [scil. Posidonius] says, and also many others [scil. definitions] that were pronounced by Zeno and recorded by Chrysippus clearly refute his [scil. Chrysippus’] view. (3) Indeed he says that distress is a fresh opinion that one is in the presence of evil. Sometimes they express it even more briefly: distress is a fresh opinion of the presence of evil. (4) He [scil. Posidonius] says that what is fresh is recent in time, and he asks that they tell him why it is that when the opinion of evil is fresh it contracts the soul and produces distress, but that after an interval it either does not contract it [scil. the soul] at all, or no longer to the same extent. (5) And yet, if Chrysippus’ teachings were true, the words ‘fresh’ should not even have been included in the definition. It would have been more consistent with his view to call distress an opinion of the presence of a great or intolerable or unbearable evil—this is his [Chrysippus’, apparently]⁶ usual term, rather than a fresh evil.

⁵ The mss. give the rather improbable ἄτης (‘baneful blindness’) which is rejected by most editors in favour of λύτης but retained by De Lacy *ad* 280.21 on the grounds that the sentence in which it occurs may be transitional so that Posidonius may turn to distress only in the next sentence. But this seems unlikely.

⁶ However, as De Lacy notes, the terms ἀνυπομόνητος and ἀκορτέρητος are not elsewhere attested for Chrysippus.

6. Gal. *PHP* 4.2.1-7 (*SVF* 3.463):

[...] in the first definitions that he gives of the generic affections he completely distances himself from their [scil. the ancients']⁷ view, defining distress as a fresh opinion that evil is present. (2) For in these (definitions) he openly mentions only the rational (part) of the soul, omitting the appetitive and spirited; for he believes that opinion and expectation arise only in the rational part. (3) Nonetheless, in his definition of appetite, which he calls an irrational desire,⁸ he touches in a way, verbally at least, on the irrational power of the soul; but here too he diverges from it in his explanation of it [i.e. of appetite], since even the desire he includes in the definition belongs to the rational power. (4) Thus he defines desire as 'rational conation for something that gives pleasure to the extent it should ...

7. Gal. *PHP* 4.7.12-17 (*SVF* 3.466):

(12) Chrysippus, too, attests in the second book *On Affections* that the affections are softened in time, even though the opinions remain that some evil has befallen them,⁹ writing as follows: (13) 'One might also inquire how the abatement of distress comes about, whether because some opinion changes or while all¹⁰ continue, and why this will occur.' (14) Then he continues: 'It seems to me that an opinion of this sort remains, viz. that what is present is evil, but as the opinion grows older the contraction slackens and, I believe, the conation directed towards the contraction. (15) But perhaps even if this¹¹ persists, the things that follow will not conform to it, because of another supervening condition of some sort which is not easily reasoned out. (16) Thus people cease weeping, and people weep against their will, when external objects¹² do not create similar

⁷ I.e. primarily Plato and Hippocrates.

⁸ For the same definition see ps. Andronicus, *De aff.* 1 (*SVF* 3.391).

⁹ I.e. the people concerned

¹⁰ Scil. opinions.

¹¹ Scil. the conation last mentioned.

¹² De Lacy translates 'underlying circumstances' but the word is attested in Hellenistic philosophical texts in the sense of objects as opposed to how things may appear to us, see e.g. Epicurus, *On nature* XI,

appearances and something or nothing stands in the way. (17) For in the same way that cessation from lament and outbreaks of weeping occur, so it is reasonable that things of this sort should also occur in those other cases,¹³ because things cause greater motion initially, as I said with reference to the things that stir laughter, and things similar to these.’

8. Gal. *PHP* 4.7.24-7, 30-1 (*SVF* 3.467, part):

(24) And he [scil. Posidonius] himself shows that the affections arise from anger and desire, and he gives the reason why they subside in time, even though the opinions and judgements still continue that an evil is present or has arisen for them [i.e. for the persons in question]. (25) In support of this point he even uses Chrysippus himself as a witness, who writes as follows in the second book of his *On Affections*: (26) ‘In the case of distress some people appear similarly to abandon it also as though they are sated. Thus the poet says the following also about Achilles grieving for Patroklos:

“But when he had his fill of weeping and rolling on the ground,
and the longing had gone from his cheeks and limbs... [*Od.* 4.541; *Il.* 24.514].”

He desired to comfort Priam by showing him the irrationality of his distress.’ (27) Then he [scil. Chrysippus] continues: ‘By this account one would not give up hope that with the passage of time and when the emotional inflammation abates, reason, making its way in and as it were finding room, exposes the irrationality of the affection.’ (28) Here Chrysippus clearly admits that the inflammation of affection subsides in time, while the supposition and opinion still persist; men get their fill of the emotional movements, and when because of this the affection has a kind of respite and grows quiet, reason gains the upper hand. This is the truth, if anything is, but it is in conflict with his premises, just as

PHercl. 1042 fr. K. col. I,14-16 Sedley; cf. also Gal. *De dign. puls.* VIII p. 793 K. (*SVF* 2.79), Sext. *M* 9.352 (*SVF* 2.80).

¹³ Chrysippus must refer to other irrational reactions, e.g. laughing against our will, as is suggested by the subsequent reference to laughter.

the next passage which goes as follows: ‘Such words are also spoken with reference to the alteration of the affections:

“Swift is the satiety of hateful distress [*Od.* 4.103],”

and moreover words like these about the attraction of distress:

“Somehow for unfortunate people
it is pleasant to weep and mourn their lot,”¹⁴

and next after these Chrysippus cites:

“Thus he spoke and in all of them he stirred a longing for lamentation [*Od.* 4.113],”

and

“Raise up the same lament
renew the tearful joy” [*Eur. Electra* 125-6].

BOOK THREE

[No identified fragments.]

BOOK FOUR: The *THERAPEUTICS*.

9. Gal. *PHP* 5.2.22-4 (*SVF* 3.471):

¹⁴ Cf. *Eur. fr.* 563 Nauck (p. 537); *Aesch. Prom. vinct.* 637.

It is not true that whereas there is an art, called medicine, concerned with the diseased body, there is no art concerned with the diseased soul, or that the latter [art] is necessarily inferior to the former in the theory and therapeutic treatment of particular cases.

Therefore, just as the physician of the body must be ‘inside’,¹⁵ as people are wont to say, the affections that befall the body and the proper cure for each, so it falls to the physician of the soul to be ‘inside’ both of these (things) in the best possible way. And one could understand that this is the case, since the analogy with these things¹⁶ was drawn from the beginning. For the parallel appropriateness¹⁷ with respect to these terms will also make clear to us, I believe, the similarity of the cures and in addition the analogy that the two kinds of medicine have with each other.

10. Gal. *PHP* 5.2.26-7 (*SVF* 3.471):

‘Just as strength and weakness, good tension and slackness are observed in the case of the body and moreover health and disease, robustness and sickliness’, and all the other affections, infirmities and illnesses he goes on to list.¹⁸ ‘In the same way,’ he says, ‘there are certain things in the rational soul that exist and are named analogously to all of these.’ He then continues: ‘I suppose that this sort of analogy and similarity has led to the sameness of their names [or: synonymy]. For we do in fact say that some persons are strong or weak also in respect of their soul, and firm or soft, and moreover ill or healthy; and we speak in this way of emotion, infirmity and the like in the soul’.

11. Gal. *PHP* 5.2.31-33 (*SVF* 3.471):

That is indeed why Zeno’s argument proceeds as it should. Disease of the soul is most similar to an unsettled state of the body. Disease of the body is said to be the lack of proportion of the [things] in it, hot and cold, dry and wet.’ And a little further on: ‘Health

¹⁵ I.e. knowledgeable about.

¹⁶ I.e. the theory and therapeutic methods of medicine applied to the body.

¹⁷ De Lacy translates ἀντιπαρτείνουσα οικειότης ‘correlative affinity’ but this seems less clear.

¹⁸ This insertion by Galen is worth retaining since it confirms the scope of Chrysippus’ analogy

in the body is a kind of good blend and proportion of the [things] specified.’¹⁹ And again subsequently: ‘For in my view a good condition of the body resides in the best blend of the [things] mentioned.’ And after that: ‘And these things too are said not inappropriately of the body, because proportion or lack of proportion in its components, hot, cold, wet and dry is health or disease; proportion or its reverse in the sinews is strength or weakness, firmness or softness; and proportion or the lack of it in the limbs is beauty or ugliness.

12. Gal. *QAM* ch. 4, pp.45.5-46.1 Müller (*SVF* 2.787):

For they hold that the soul, like nature (φύσιν), is a kind of breath (πνεῦμα) but that [scil. pneuma] of nature is more humid and colder, whereas that of the soul is drier and hotter. That is why this pneuma, too, is a kind of matter (ὕλη) appropriate to the soul and the form (εἶδος) of the matter is such-and-such temperament (κρᾶσις) consisting in a proportion of the airy and the fiery substance (οὐσίᾳς). For one cannot say that the soul is just air or just fire. Indeed, it would not be possible for the body of an animal to become excessively hot, or excessively cold, nor to be dominated by either of these by large excess, since, even if it exceeds the right measure (τοῦ συμμέτρου) just a little bit, the animal, with its surplus of fire beyond measure, becomes feverish. By contrast, it becomes cold and livid and nearly or indeed completely senseless whenever air prevails because this, insofar as this depends on it alone, is cold in itself, and by being mixed with the fiery element it becomes well-tempered. It has, then, become clear to you now that in the view of the Stoics the substance of the soul comes to be according to a particular mixture (κρᾶσις) of air and fire. And Chrysippus has been made intelligent because of the well-tempered blend of these two [elements], while the sons of Hippocrates whom the comedians²⁰ mock for their foolishness, [have been made] swinish because of the boundless heat.

¹⁹ Viz. the elementary qualities, hot, cold, dry and wet.

²⁰ Cf. Aristophanes fr. 116 Kassel - Austin (= fr. 112 Kock). On the frequent reference to comedy by the Stoics, see *supra*, p. 00. But it is not certain that this reference comes from Chrysippus since Galen intimately knew the poets of the Old Attic comedy, including Aristophanes, in whose Greek he was keenly interested: see *Lib. prop.* ch. 17, p.124.7ff.

13. Gal. *PHP* 5.2.47, 49 (*SVF* 3.471a):

Therefore by analogy the soul will also be called beautiful or ugly in terms of the proportion or disproportion of certain parts of such and such a kind [...] They are the parts of the soul of which its reason and its condition consist. And a soul is beautiful or ugly in virtue of its regent part being in this or that state with respect to its own proper divisions.

14. Gal. *PHP* 5.2.13-14 (*SVF* 3.465):

We must suppose that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish condition of the body in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregularly and at random from the disposition [scil. of the patient] and at the incidence of small causes.

15. Gal. *PHP* 4.5.7 (*SVF* 3.476):

‘Fluttering’ too has been appropriately used to characterize the affections as a class in view of this instability and moving at random.

16. Calcidius, *In Platonis Timaeum* ch. 165 (*SVF* 3.229):

The cause of error is manifold. The first is the one which the Stoics call the double perversion. This arises both from the things themselves and from the dissemination of what people say. For to those that have just been born or fall from the womb birth occurs with a certain amount of pain, since they move from a hot and humid dwelling into the cold and dryness of the air that engulfs them. Directed against this pain and coldness suffered by the children is, by way of an antidote, the artificial measure taken by the midwives, viz. that the newly born are cherished by means of warm water and alternating baths are used and a likeness of the maternal womb [is created] through the warming up and the cuddling, whereupon the tender body relaxes and becomes calm. Thus from both these sensations, of pain as well as pleasure, arises a certain natural²¹ opinion that everything pleasant and agreeable is good and that everything which by contrast brings sorrow is bad and to be eschewed.

²¹ On this term (which is here weakened by *quaedam*) in a similar context, see *supra*, n. 00.

17. Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, VIII, 51: vol. II, p.266.18 ff. Kö. (SVF 3.474, second text): ‘For even if,’ he says, ‘there are three kinds of good things, even so the affections have to be cured; but one should not at the moment of inflammation of the affections bother about the doctrine which has previously won over the person troubled by the affection: the available therapy should by no means at an inconvenient time be wasted on overthrowing the doctrines which have occupied the soul first.’ And he says: ‘Even if pleasure is the good and this is the view taken by the person controlled by the affection, nonetheless he should be helped and it should be shown to him that even for those who consider pleasure to be the good and indeed the end any affection is inconsistent’.

Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 3.76: Chrysippus holds that the main point in consoling is to take away from the grieving person that opinion which makes him believe that he is fulfilling the right and due obligation.

18. Gal. *PHP* 4.6.19-20 (SVF 3.473):

... thus the soul of Menelaus, as presented in tragedy, abandoned its decision²² because it was beguiled by his desire, Medea’s soul because it was forced by anger. Somehow in her case Chrysippus is unaware that that he cites Euripides’ words against himself:

I understand what kind of evils I am going to do

But anger is stronger than my considerations

(*Medea* 1078-9)

Cf. *ibid.* 4.6.23: But Chrysippus does not notice the contradiction here, and he writes innumerable other statements of this kind, as when he says: ‘This movement, irrational and turned away from reason, is, as I think, something very common, by reference to which we say that some people are moved by anger’ (SVF 3.475).

²² I.e. to kill his unfaithful wife Helen. Menelaus’ case is discussed from 4.5.7 onward (including Chrysippus’ quotation of E. *Andromache*, 629-630), see *supra*, p. 00.

19. Gal. *PHP* 4.6.24-25 (*SVF* 3.475):

‘Therefore we behave in the case of these persons who are in a state of emotion as we do towards persons who are out of their minds and we speak to them as to persons who are twisted and are not in their right minds or in control of themselves.’ The next, explaining again this last point: ‘This twisting and withdrawing from oneself occurs in accordance with nothing other than the act of turning away from reason’.

20. Gal. *PHP* 4. 35 (*SVF* 3.478):

Persons thus angered are also appropriately said to be carried away, like those who are carried too far onward in races, the similarity being in the excess, which in the runners goes counter to their conation in running and in the persons angered counter to their own reason. For they could not be said, like those who are in control of their movement, to be moving in conformity with themselves but instead to be moving in conformity with some force external to themselves.

21. Gal. *PHP* 4.6.27-32 (*SVF* 3.475):

This is why it is possible to hear utterances of this kind both in the case of people in love and persons with other fervent desires, and of angry persons, that they want to gratify their drive and to let them be, whether it is better or not, and to say nothing to them, and that this must be done by all means, even if they are wrong and if it is disadvantageous to them ... Loved ones expect that their lover have impulses of especially this kind towards them, that their attitude should be rather ill-considered and with concern for reason and furthermore that they should defy admonitory discourse [or: reason, λόγος] or rather do by no means whatsoever bear hearing any discourse [or: reason] of that kind. They keep so far away from the (admonitory) discourse [or: reason] that it is not out of place to say to them such things as these:

‘For even when censured Cypris does let go;
indeed, if you use force, she loves to strive even more.

Eros, when censured

presses more heavily.²³

Furthermore they reject the (admonitory) discourse [or: reason] as an untimely censor, unsympatetic to the affairs of love, like a man who is held to admonish unseasonably, at a time when even the gods are thought to permit them to swear false oaths. Permit us - they say - to do what occurs to us and follow our desire.

22. Gal. *PHP* 4.6.34, 40 (*SVF* 3.478) (lines of verse quoted by Chrysippus in illustration of grief):

I got my intellect in hand
and stowed it in a pot.

(Menander fr. 702 Körte-Thierfelder).

- What would you gain if you let yourself grieve forever?

- I too know that but a certain love distracts me (Euripides, *Alcestis* 1079-80).

Bear up and do not let the grief in your spirit be inflexible.

You will achieve noting by mourning for your son.

You will not make him rise up; sooner you will suffer yet another evil (Homer, *Iliad* Ω 549-551).

Galen adds: 'He [scil. Chrysippus] says that Achilles says these things 'speaking in his right mind' —these are the very words he wrote—but that Achilles not infrequently abandons these same judgements in adverse circumstances and does not have power over himself when overcome by emotions' (*ibid.* 40-41, *SVF* 3.478).

23. Gal. *PHP* 4.6.43 (*SVF* 3.478):

²³ Euripides, Fr. 340 Nauck.

That in us which is agitated and changed and disobedient to reason arises no less in the case of pleasure.

24. Gal. *PHP* 4.6.44-46 (*SVF* 3.478; cf. Philodemus, *De ira*, col. I.10-20 Indelli):

We take such leave of ourselves and get so far outside of ourselves and are so completely blinded in our frustrations that sometimes if we have a sponge or a piece of wool in our hands we lift it up and throw it as if we would thereby accomplish anything. If we had happened to have a knife or some other object, we should have used it in the same way [...] Often in this kind of blindness we bite keys and beat against the doors when they are not quickly opened, and if we stumble on a stone we take punitive measures, breaking it and throwing it somewhere, and all the while we use the strangest language. [...] From such actions one would grasp both the irrational nature of the affections and how blinded we are on such occasions, as though we had become different persons from those who had earlier engaged in philosophical conversations.

25. Gal. *PHP* 4.5.21-2 (*SVF* 3.480):

For these infirmities are not spoken of as being in the judgement that each of these things is good but also in respect of being given to them beyond what is natural, for which reason it is quite reasonable that some are called ‘woman-mad’ and ‘bird-mad’.

